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RAWLSIAN FAIRNESS AND REGIME CHOICE
IN THE LAW OF ACCIDENTS
Gregory C. Keating*
The political philosophy of John Rawls is pregnant with
implications for the tort theory. Our law of intentional and accidental
physical injury is rich with the rhetoric of reasonableness and fairness,
and these ideals lie at the heart of Rawls's political philosophy. The
figure of the reasonable person is central both to the law of
negligence-where it serves as the master criterion of justified risk
imposition-and to the law of intentional torts-where it helps to
define the contours of permissible self-defense, the sensibility by
which the offensiveness of contact in battery is measured, and the
content of the consent given in connection with matters as diverse as
The concept of
contact sports and medical operations.1
reasonableness figures prominently in strict liability as well. The
intentional infliction of unreasonable harm triggers liability for
damages in the law of nuisance, and strict liability in general can be
fruitfully understood as a form of liability applicable when the
conduct which leads to accidental injury is reasonable, but the failure
to make reparation for the harm done is unreasonable.2 Principles of
fairness figure more prominently in the judicial rhetoric of strict
products liability than economic ideas of efficient precaution and
efficient insurance do.3
* William T. Dalessi Professor of Law, USC Law School. For instruction and advice, I
am grateful to Ken Abraham, Scott Altman, Charles Fried, Richard Fallon, Louis
Kaplow, Scott Michelman, Lewis Sargentich, Arthur Ripstein, and Ben Zipursky; to
the participants at the conference; and to the participants at a faculty workshop at
Harvard Law School. Special thanks are owed to Jim Fleming for organizing the
conference and to Ben Zipursky for organizing the torts panel.
1. On reasonableness in negligence law, see Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness
and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 311 (1996). On the various
roles of reasonableness in intentional tort law, see the materials in Robert E. Keeton
et al., Tort and Accident Law 30-93 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter Tort and Accident
Law].
2. On nuisance, see Tort and Accident Law, supra note 1, at 123-36, 897-917. On
strict liability, see id. at 283-84, 294-307; Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the
Law of Torts, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 401 (1959).
3. See James A. Henderson, Jr., JudicialReliance on Public Policy: An Empirical
Analysis of Products Liability Decisions, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1570, 1589, 1597
(1991) (noting that "[m]easured by what judges say in their published opinions...
fairness norms, not efficiency norms" predominate, and their predominance increases
when they conflict with efficiency rationales).
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For the last thirty or so years, however, normatively inclined
academic discourse on the law of accidents has been carried on largely
in the idioms of efficiency and corrective justice. Powerful and
illuminating as much of this work has been, it has tended to obscure
the prominence of conceptions of reasonableness and fairness in our
law of accidents. John Rawls's great work provides us with the tools
to restore those ideals to an equally prominent place in normative
discourse about the law of accidents. My aim in this paper is to put
Rawls's philosophy to work by examining the choice between
negligence and strict liability from a fairness perspective. I hope to
show both the power and fertility of Rawls's ideas, and the robustness
of fairness concerns in our law of accidents.
My particular topic is one that has been touched on before from a
Rawlsian perspective. Early in the 1970s, as Rawls's theory was first
bursting upon the legal academy, George Fletcher wrote a celebrated
article, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory.4 Fletcher's remarkable
article connected Rawls's work with reciprocity (and nonreciprocity)
of risk imposition. Fletcher argued that nonreciprocity of risk both
characterized realms of strict liability within tort accident law and
justified those realms, whereas reciprocity of risk characterized and
justified realms of tort accident law that were governed by negligence
liability.'
In this Article, I argue against Fletcher's identification of fairness in
the choice between negligence and strict liability with the presence or
absence of reciprocity of risk, and in favor of focusing on the fair
distribution of the costs of accidental injury among those who benefit
from the imposition of the underlying risks. I argue, further, that a
distinctively Rawlsian conception of fairness lends support to a
powerful general case for preferring strict enterprise liability to
negligence liability.
The allure of reciprocity of risk as a master criterion of fairness is
evident. When risks are reciprocal, they are equal in probability and
magnitude and are imposed for equally good reason. The right to
impose a risk enhances the freedom of potential injurers and the
exercise of that right endangers the security of potential victims.
Reciprocity of risk defines a community of equal freedom and mutual
benefit. Reciprocity of risk defines a community of equal freedom,
4. George P. Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537
(1972). Charles Fried's An Anatomy of Values 183-206 (1970), also connected
Rawls's political philosophy with reciprocity of risk imposition, but focused less on
the choice between negligence and strict liability. The emphasis on reciprocity of risk
in tort theory has a long history, running back through the work of Francis H. Bohlen
in the early twentieth century, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 59 U. Pa. L. Rev. 298,
373, 423 (1911) (pts. 1-3), to the opinion of Lord Cairns in Rylands v. Fletcher,3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868) (appeal taken from Ex.), and the opinion in Losee v.
Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873).
5. See generally Fletcher, supra note 4.
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because reciprocity exists when risks are equal in probability and
gravity. When risks are equal in these respects, people relinquish
equal amounts of security and gain equal amounts of liberty.
Reciprocity of reasonable risk defines a situation of mutual benefit
because risks are reasonable when the benefits of imposing them are
greater than the burdens of bearing them. Reciprocity of risk thus
defines a fair situation with respect to the distribution of risk.
When risks are not reciprocal, risk is not fairly distributed. By
prescribing payment for harm done, strict liability redresses, ex post,
the ex ante unfairness of nonreciprocal risk.
When risks are
reciprocal, strict liability is superfluous. When risks are reciprocal,
"strict liability does no more than substitute one form of risk for
another-the risk of liability for the risk of personal lOss." ' 6 This, in a
nutshell, is Fletcher's argument.
Fletcher's argument is elegant and powerful, but its preoccupation
with risk of physical injury-rather than with physical injury itself-is
troubling. With rare exceptions, risk of physical injury is cause for
concern only because it occasionally erupts into actual injury.
Physical injury is what devastates and destroys lives. Physical injury is
what gives the law of accidents its moral urgency. Reciprocity of risk
defines a circumstance where the burdens and benefits of risk are
proportional and to everyone's benefit.
It is more important,
however, to make the burdens and benefits of harm-of accidental
physical injury-proportional. It is more important to distribute the
costs of accidents fairly.
Harm itself is distributed fairly only when harm-not risk-is
reciprocal. Reciprocity of harm, however, is only found in the law of
nuisance, and even then only in the case of the mutual, low level
interferences with each other's use and enjoyment of property that are
the subject of the "live and let live" rule of nuisance law.7 Accidental
physical injury, however, is rarely reciprocal, and fortunately so.
Reasonable risk impositions only occasionally result in accidental
physical injury. Harm, therefore, befalls only a few of those exposed
to reciprocal risk. In accident law, the alternative to the fair
distribution of risk is not the fair distribution of harm, but the fair
distribution of the costs of accidents across those who benefit from the
imposition of the relevant risks. In accident law, the alternative to the
reciprocity of risk criterion is the enterprise liability version of strict
liability. Enterprise liability in tort pins the costs of accidentsnegligent and nonnegligent alike-on the enterprises or activities
6. Id. at 547.
7. The "live and let live" rule is usually traced to Baron Bramwell's opinion in
Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27 (Ex. Ch. 1862). The opinion gives the
following nineteenth century list of examples subject to the "live and let live" rule of
no liability for low-level nuisances: "burning weeds, emptying cess-pools, making
noises during repairs." Id. at 32; see also infra note 55 and accompanying text.
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responsible for them.8 By doing so, enterprise liability distributes the

costs of concentrated accidental injuries among participants in the
enterprise who benefit from its risk impositions.
It makes a difference, I believe, whether ideas of fairness (Rawlsian
or otherwise) are best expressed by the idea of reciprocity of risk or
by enterprise liability. Identifying fairness with reciprocity of risk
leads to the view that fairness ideas in tort find their fullest expression
in a common law regime which resembles the common law of

accidents at the turn of the twentieth century.9 Identifying fairness
with reciprocity of risk leads to an implicit defense of the common law
as it was a century ago-to a kind of nostalgia. Identifying fairness

with the fair distribution of the costs of accidents leads to a very
different view of the proper shape of the law of accidents. Identifying
fairness with the fair distribution of harm leads-presumptively-to
favoring the expansion of enterprise liability, both within and beyond
the tort law of accidents.

It leads to seeing a wide variety of

administrative schemes, including workers' compensation, no-fault
automobile insurance, industry-wide liability for black lung disease,
and even the society-wide liability of the New Zealand Accident

Compensation scheme, as continuous with the tort law of accidents.

°

Identifying fairness with enterprise liability leads to an agenda for

progress and reform.
Part I of this Article sketches the core elements of a fairness
conception of accidental risk imposition, drawing in some detail on

Rawlsian ideas of reasonableness, interpersonal comparison, and fair
social cooperation. Part II reconstructs the reciprocity of risk
criterion as a way of bringing that conception to bear on the choice
between negligence and strict liability in tort law, and then argues

against the reciprocity of risk criterion as the principal ground for
choosing between these doctrines."

The latter half of Part II argues

that fairness theories should be concerned more with harm than with
risk, and more with the distribution of the costs of accidental harm
8. See generally Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir.
1968).
9. See Fletcher, supra note 4, at 543-51.
10. Fletcher sees enterprise liability as the expression of loss-spreading ideas
entirely independent of fairness, and indeed opposed to fairness. See id. Fletcher
describes "loss-shifting in products-liability cases" as "a mechanism of insurance." Id.
at 544 n.24. Fletcher describes insurance arguments for the imposition of strict
liability as arguments of "distributive rather than corrective justice." Id. at 547 n.40.
Imposing liability on insurance or loss-spreading grounds "violates the premise of
corrective justice, namely that liability should turn on what the defendant has done,
rather than on who he is." Id. Many legal scholars likewise see administrative
accident schemes, and even enterprise liability within tort, as animated by ideas which
are foreign to the core of tort law. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs 395406 (1992); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 171-204 (1995).
11. My reconstruction is meant to put the best face on the criterion as a
specification of fairness in tort. Fletcher might not accept this reconstruction.
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Irrespective of the initial
than with the distribution of risk.
distribution of risk, it is fairer to distribute the costs of accidents
across those who benefit from the imposition of the relevant risks than
it is to leave those costs concentrated on random victims.
Part III examines how this idea-the idea that harms ought not be
concentrated on victims and ought to be dispersed across those who
benefit from the risk impositions responsible for those harms-finds
expression in enterprise liability. A Rawlsian conception of fairness
can and does, I argue, lead us to favor the enterprise liability principle
of fairness over the reciprocity of risk criterion, but it does not
determine the content of the enterprise liability conception of fairness
itself. Part III lays out the understanding of fairness that enterprise
liability embodies, and argues that the enterprise liability
understanding is instituted in a variety of ways, inside and outside the
law of torts. The section places particular emphasis on the expression
of enterprise liability ideas by a variety of nonfault administrative
plans, ranging in breadth from plans covering particular kinds of
injuries-vaccination related health injuries, for example-through
plans covering particular kinds of activities-e.g., workplace accidents
or automobile related ones-to plans whose reach is society-widesuch as the New Zealand Accident Compensation Plan.
No-fault administrative plans illuminate several essential elements
of enterprise liability. For one thing, administrative plans are able to
implement enterprise liability ideas of fairness in circumstances where
tort accident law cannot. No-fault automobile insurance, for example,
is able to implement enterprise liability in a setting where the common
law is unable to do so, because the common law cannot devise
nonfault criteria for sorting injurers and victims in the case of
automobile related accidents.12 No-fault administrative plans also
illuminate two essential aspects of the idea of fairness at work in
enterprise liability. First, the implementation of enterprise liability by
these plans vividly illustrates the attenuation of causation implicit in
the idea that the costs of the accidents characteristic of an activity
should be shared by all those who benefit from that activity. The
enterprise liability principle of fairness retains the traditional tort
requirement of harm as a condition of liability, but relaxes or
attenuates the traditional tort focus on causation, because it holds that
accident costs should be dispersed across all those who benefit from
the underlying risks. Indeed, the relaxation of causation by these
plans is one of the reasons that they can realize enterprise liability
ideals in circumstances where the common law cannot.

12. As Baron Bramwell put it long ago, "Where two carriages come in collision, if
there is no negligence in either it is as much the act of the one driver as of the other
that they meet." Fletcher v. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737, 744 (Ex. 1865) (Bramwell, J.,
dissenting), affid 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868) (appeal taken from Ex.).
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Second, no-fault administrative accident plans illustrate the
elasticity of the idea of "enterprise." Enterprise liability blossoms in
ever-widening circles, expanding from the common law liability of
particular firms through the liability of entire industries, to societywide liability. The fact that it does teaches us much about the form of
liability. The benefits of risky activities radiate outward in concentric
circles. Nuclear power most benefits those who produce and consume
it, but it also benefits those of us who merely happen to live in a
society made richer by the presence of nuclear power plants.
Generally speaking, the benefits of most risky activities radiate
outward until they diminish to the point of being unidentifiable.
Specifying the relevant community of benefit is a standing task for
enterprise liability schemes; a task whose performance requires the
exercise of essentially contestable, normative, political judgment.
Part IV examines how even a system of tort accident law animated
by a firm commitment to ideas of fairness which find their natural
expression in enterprise liability would nonetheless cede substantial
chunks of the tort law of accidents to negligence, and even to no
liability at all. The barriers to complete common law enterprise
liability examined in this section are partly the flip side of the
advantages of the administrative schemes studied in Part III, partly
the product of other practical problems, and partly the consequence of
competing normative considerations.
I. A FAIRNESS FRAMEWORK
A. The Contours of Fairness
The fairness conception that I shall sketch has a number of
elements. One of these is a conception of persons. It supposes that
we are each equal, independent persons; self-governing agents with
purposes to pursue and lives to lead. 3 We each have the capacity to
lead our lives in accordance with some conception of their point, and a
deep interest in living under institutions that enable us to do so. To
make our lives answer to our aspirations, we need, among other
things, a substantial measure of security-of freedom from accidental
injury and death at the hands of others. "Security," John Stuart Mill
remarked:
no human being can possibly do without; on it we depend for
all our immunity from evil and for the whole value of all and
every good, beyond the passing moment; since nothing but the

13. This is a commitment that the fairness conception shares with more libertarian
ones. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Right and Wrong 28-29 (1978) ("Respect for Persons").
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gratification of the instant could be of any worth to us, if we
could be deprived of everything the next instant. 4
Our need for security, however, is only half the story. We also need
a substantial measure of liberty-of freedom to put others at risk of
physical harm in pursuit of our own ends. When we act we put others
at peril, even if only very slightly, and even when we act with
appropriate caution. If we are not permitted to imperil others-if we
cannot endanger their security-we cannot act and so cannot pursue
our ends and lead our lives. Maximal security extinguishes liberty and
maximal liberty devastates security. Yet substantial measures of each
are essential preconditions of effective agency. This is the dilemma at
the heart of accident law.
When the law of accidents licenses the imposition of a risk, it
enhances the freedom of some and imperils the security of others.
Those who impose the risk are set free to pursue ends and activities
that they value, and their pursuit exposes others to risks of physical
harm. When the law of accidents forbids the imposition of some risk,
it does the reverse-it curbs the freedom of prospective injurers and
enhances the security of potential victims. Risk impositions thus pit
the liberty of injurers against the security of victims, and the law of
accidents sets the terms on which these competing freedoms are
reconciled. The task of the tort law of accidents is to reconcile liberty
and security on terms that are both favorable and fair. Favorable
terms enable people to pursue their aims and aspirations over the
course of complete lives; fair terms reconcile the competing claims of
liberty and security in ways that are acceptable even to those they
disadvantage. 5
The question of how best to reconcile the pursuit of activities we
value with the physical and psychological integrity that those activities
can jeopardize is, of course, an issue that each of us must face
individually. What ends are worth the risks they entail? Are the risks
14. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (1863), reprinted in Utilitarianism and On
Liberty 181, 226 (Mary Warnock ed., 2d ed. 2003).
15. This conception of the problem of accidental harm has its roots in the social
contract tradition in political theory, especially as carried on by contemporary
philosophers such as John Rawls, Tim Scanlon, and Thomas Nagel. "Liberty" and
"security" in the sense used here, however, do not identify "primary goods" lexically
superior to income and wealth in the manner of the liberties covered by Rawls's first
principle of justice. "Liberty" and "security" are general cover terms designed to
characterize, at a fairly high level of generality, the stakes in accidental risk
imposition. The burdens and benefits of risk include increases and losses in wealth
and income, so there is no question of these freedoms being lexically prior to the
primary goods of wealth and income. Thus, in judging the reasonableness of various
risk impositions or liability rules, we should assess the significance of gains and losses
in wealth and income in terms of their impacts on liberty and security.
Why characterize the interests at stake in risk impositions as interests in
freedom at all? Because risks and risk reduction affect the space that we have to
form, evaluate, and act upon our aims and aspirations.
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of death and disfigurement that are the price of scaling Mount Everest
worth the sense of accomplishment that comes from standing on its
summit? Are increased risks of cancer worth bearing as the price of
performing pathbreaking medical research? Are increased risks of
cancer worth bearing as the price of earning an ordinary paycheck?
This kind of individual choice is not, however, the chief concern of the
law of accidents. The problem of accidental harm is a problem of
social choice-of how best to reconcile the competing claims of liberty
and security for a plurality of persons.
More fully, the problem of accidental harm requires reconciling the
competing claims of liberty and security for a plurality of persons,
each of whom is independent, all of whom are equal, and among
whom diverse and incommensurable conceptions of the good flourish.
Because people are equal and independent, the terms of accidental
risk imposition must be ones that equal people might freely accept as
legitimate for the governance of their lives in common. Diverse and
incommensurable ends and aspirations flourish among free people
because the range of valuable activities and valuable ways of life is
diverse. Because people have distinct lives to lead, and because their
aims and ends diverge, the principles of social choice differ markedly
from the principles of individual choice. Individually, it may be
rational to expose ourselves to risks that it would be unreasonableunfair-to impose on others.
1. Rationality and Reasonableness
The distinction between reasonableness and rationality is one
drawn by ordinary discourse. 6 Rationality requires the intelligent
pursuit of one's ends, whatever those ends are. Reasonableness
requires taking the impact of one's conduct on other people into
account as a circumstance capable of influencing one's decisions, and
being prepared to govern one's conduct on a basis acceptable to
others whom one's conduct affects. Rationality and reasonableness
may well diverge. It may be perfectly rational for the owner of a dock
to demand exorbitant compensation for permitting a ship to tie up at
the dock during a gale. 7 The gale gives the dock owner a very strong
hand to play; playing that hand to the hilt is eminently rational. It
may be equally rational for the ship owner-faced, otherwise, with the
loss of his ship-to pay exorbitant compensation. The gale gives the
16. See W.M. Sibley, The Rational Versus the Reasonable,62 Phil. Rev. 554 (1953).
Sibley's description of rationality, which the text follows, is a basic and familiar one,
but probably not the only way of specifying the concept, even at a very general level.
17. The circumstance (though not, so far as I know, the bargaining) arose in
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). In this
circumstance, the doctrine of private necessity applies. The doctrine extinguishes the
property right to exclude, and entitles the dock owner only to compensation for harm
done.
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ship owner a correspondingly poor hand to play. But it is also
unreasonable for the dock owner to insist on such exorbitant
compensation. Reasonable terms of cooperation are terms that the
parties to them would regard as fair, were they to find themselves in
each other's shoes. Judgments of reasonableness abstract from
inequalities of bargaining power. Reasonable terms of cooperationfair terms of cooperation-are terms that parties would be prepared
to accept absent the coercion of circumstance or, indeed, absent any
coercion at all. Reasonable terms of cooperation attract unforced
agreement. A hard bargain stuck by a dock owner at the expense of a
ship owner whose ship faces all but certain destruction at the hands of
a gale unless the dock owner grants permission to dock, is not an
unforced agreement. It is the very force of unfavorable circumstance
that the dock owner seeks to exploit and which gives the ship owner
reason to acquiesce.
Driving a hard bargain is rational-but
unreasonable-behavior on the dock owner's part.
Drawing on the distinction between rationality and reasonableness,
it makes sense to say that risk impositions may be at once rational and
unreasonable. We may say, for example, that the rationality of
exposing oneself to a risk depends on the end furthered by the
exposure, the importance that one attaches to furthering that end, and
the efficacy with which the exposure will further the end. The canons
of rationality thus give wide rein to individual subjectivity, and are
naturally expressed in the language of efficiency. Individuals are free
to value the burdens and benefits of risks by any metric they choose,
and it is surely natural for them to value burdens and benefits by their
own subjective criteria of well-being. It is also rational for individuals
to run risks whenever, by their own lights, the expected benefits of so
doing exceed the expected costs, and to decline to run risks whenever
the expected costs exceed the benefits.
The rationality of a risk imposition is not, however, enough to
guarantee its reasonableness. It is not necessarily reasonable for
people to expose others to risks because-by the potential injurer's
own evaluation of the end furthered by the risk imposition-the
benefits of imposing the risk exceed the burdens of having to bear
exposure to it.
Rational risk impositions are not necessarily
reasonable ones because other people have different values and
distinct lives. The distinct lives of different people cannot be
collapsed into a single life that reaps both the burdens and the
benefits of rational risk impositions. Some people will die at the
hands of risk impositions whose benefits will accrue to others. In a
world of distinct persons who affirm diverse and incommensurable
conceptions of the good, there is, moreover, no reason to assume that
potential victims of any given risk imposition value the ends pursued
through that risk imposition in the same way as the potential injurer
imposing the risks does. The fact that you may be prepared to run
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enormous risks for the advancement of medical knowledge does not
mean that I am prepared to do so. The fact that I might be willing to
suffer the risks of hurtling down the road at 100 miles per hour does
not mean that you are willing to suffer the risks of my doing so. The
diverse aims of a plurality of persons cannot be converted into a single
scale, so that we may make collectively the same kinds of judgments
that we each make individually. Because lives are distinct and values
diverse, "sacrificing another for one's
own purposes must be viewed as
'1 8
different from sacrificing oneself."
2. Rawlsian Reasonableness
The general idea of reasonableness on which we have drawn
suggests that risks must be imposed on terms which are acceptable to
a plurality of persons with distinct lives and diverse ends and
preferences. Political philosophy in a Rawlsian vein 9 elaborates on
the general idea of reasonableness in a number of ways. First, it
supposes that reasonableness and rationality are complementary
notions. Reasonable people have diverse ends--diverse conceptions
of their own rational advantage; diverse preferences, ends, and
aspirations. Second, political philosophy in a Rawlsian vein supposes
that reasonable people share the common aim of reaching unforced
agreement on fair terms of cooperation.
The interactions of reasonable people are thus different from the
interactions of purely rational actors. Rational egoists interacting
with other rational egoists seek to determine the course of action
which will best advance their own interests, given the existence of
other rational agents seeking to advance their own interests as best
they can. They seek to determine the course of action most likely to
maximize their own advantage. Rational agents tend to cooperate on
terms that are mutually advantageous-on terms that make everyone
better off with respect to their preexisting situation, in the way that
Pareto-superior transactions do. Reasonable people, by contrast, do
not interact with other reasonable people by seeking their own
greatest advantage. Reasonable people seek to cooperate on fair
terms with other equal, independent, and reasonable people.
Fair terms do not necessarily advantage everyone they affect in the
sense of making everyone they affect better off than they were under
the preexisting distribution of advantages. Measured against the
baseline of preexisting entitlements, the move from an unfair situation
to a more fair one does not improve the situation of those who
profited from the preexisting unfairness. The enfranchisement of
some previously disenfranchised group on the ground that fairness
18. Fried, supra note 4, at 191.
19. 1 am drawing here principally on the discussions of reasonableness in John
Rawls, Political Liberalism 48-66 (1996).
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requires it, for example, does not improve the lot of those who
benefited from the subordination and disenfranchisement of the
group. Reasonableness is thus linked to an idea of mutual benefit, but
not to the idea of mutual advantage against a preexisting baseline of
entitlements. Reasonableness is linked to reciprocity-to terms that
define appropriate terms of cooperation among equals.
Among equals, fair terms of cooperation are determined not by
comparing advantage and disadvantage against the baseline of
preexisting entitlements, but by comparing burdens and benefits to
those affected under alternative possible principles of cooperation.
The reasonableness of preferring a regime of strict liability to one of
negligence, for example, depends on comparing burdens to victims
under negligence to burdens to injurers under strict liability-not on
comparing the advantages to some and the disadvantages to others of
moving from a regime of negligence to one of strict liability.
3. Interpersonal Comparison
Because the reasonableness of possible terms of cooperation turns
on their distribution of the burdens and benefits of cooperation, some
criteria for comparing burdens and benefits are necessary. This is a
formidable challenge in its own right. When people affirm diverse and
incommensurable ends, the criteria of interpersonal comparison, by
which burdens and benefits are measured, must be "mutually
acceptable to people whose preferences diverge."2 The overlap in
people's needs (in contrast to the divergence in their aspirations,
preferences, and wants) makes this possible.
People whose
preferences diverge may still need many of the same things: liberty,
security, health, income, and wealth, for example. The ambition
behind Rawls's "primary goods" is to identify the institutional
conditions (equal liberties) and "all purpose goods" that people need
to pursue their diverse ends and aspirations, and to make these goods
and institutional conditions the basis of interpersonal comparison of
well-being.2 1 Freedom of action and security are "institutional
conditions" akin to the basic liberties so far as accidental risk
imposition is concerned.
Freedom of action and security are
conditions on whose importance people with diverging preferences

20. T. M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72 J. Phil. 655, 668 (1975).
21. In the parlance of the interpersonal comparison literature, these are generally
described as "objective" criteria of interpersonal comparison, in contradistinction to
"subjective" ones. "Subjective" criteria of interpersonal comparison evaluate "the
level of well-being enjoyed by a person in given material circumstances or the
importance for that person of a given benefit or sacrifice.., solely from the point of
view of that person's tastes and interests." Id. at 656. Objective criteria appraise
burdens and benefits in terms that are "the best available standard of justification...
mutually acceptable to people whose [aims, ends, and] preferences diverge." Id. at
668.
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can agree. Their importance does not depend on affirming any
particularpreferences or on holding any particular set of ends and
aspirations.
Their importance depends on having ends and
aspirations, and on having a fundamental interest in being able to
realize those ends and aspirations over the course of a normal life.
Freedom and security are essential conditions for the pursuit of most
of the ends human beings hold, especially when we think of pursuing
ends over the course of a complete life. Risks of physical harm
materialize into physical harm, and physical harm can end the pursuit
of one's aims and objectives entirely. Even when physical harm does
not lead to death, it can profoundly disrupt the pursuit of ends and
aspirations, rendering the realization of some ends impossible and
severely impeding the pursuit of other ends. Conversely, freedom of
action is prima facie enabling of the pursuit of one's ends, whatever
they are. Being forbidden to act at all-because the risk of physical
injury to others is too great-would cripple the pursuit of almost any
end. Being forbidden to act in certain ways-because those ways
endanger other people too much-tends to impede the pursuit of at
least some ends.
The reasonableness of risk impositions thus turns on the way that
the impositions reconcile the competing claims of liberty and security.
Risk impositions are reasonable when the freedom to impose a risk is
more valuable than the foregone security that is the necessary price of
that risk imposition. They are unreasonable when the security lost is
more valuable than the freedom of action potentially gained. More
concrete categories are necessary when we make the judgments about
the reasonableness of particular risks and precautions, as we do in
negligence law, for example.22 The question before us, however, is
different. We are concerned with the reasonableness of choosing
negligence over strict liability, and vice-versa. In this context, the
relatively abstract account of the interests at stake given by the terms
"liberty" and "security" seems sufficient.
The choice between
negligence and strict liability is a highly general one, and it is natural
to think about it in highly general terms.
4. Reasonable Regime Choice and the Original Position
Within legal scholarship, Rawls's work is associated above all with
the device of the "original position."2 3 The framework that I have
sketched omits that device entirely. My reasons for this are threefold.
First, the enterprise on which I am embarked is an exercise in non22. For discussion of how the common law of negligence proceeds in this regard,
see Fried, supra note 4, at 191-93. See generally Keating, supra note 1.
23. The device of the original position has been seized on by scholars who borrow
nothing else from Rawls. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal
Profession: A Demand Side Perspective,49 Md. L. Rev. 869, 875-77 (1990) (invoking
the idea of decision behind a "veil of ignorance").
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ideal theory-an essentially Dworkinian endeavor to determine
whether expanding the domain of strict enterprise liability and
proportionately shrinking the domain of negligence liability makes
our existing law of accidents the fairest law that it might be. We are
looking for an understanding of fairness that speaks to the distribution
of the costs of accidents and tells us how we might best understand
and reshape the accident law that we have. Our inquiry is therefore
both into and constrained by the two fundamental principles of
responsibility for harm done that our law institutes. We are not
engaged in an exercise in ideal theory-we are not beginning with a
blank slate, setting out to determine the ideal law of accidents.
Rawls's theory of justice, by contrast, is an exercise in ideal theoryan attempt to work out the best conception of justice for persons who
are free and equal, and who accept various conditions (e.g., the
circumstances of justice) as constraints on the conception that they
might choose. Direct application of Rawls's theory is therefore
inappropriate.
Second, I believe that if we were to extend the enterprise of A
Theory of Justice and inquire-at the legislative stage-into the
accident law regime that a just society would adopt, we would
discover that Rawls's principles of justice leave a great deal of latitude
in the choice of such regimes, and that the choice of the best regime
would depend heavily on the particular historical traditions and
present conditions of the society. A theory that leaves open the
choice between capitalism and market socialism surely leaves ample
room for accident law schemes ranging from the common law of torts
through New Zealand style social insurance and direct regulation of
risk.
Third, the device of the original position bears an ambiguous
relation to the central ideas of Rawls's theory. On the one hand, it
illuminates the relation between A Theory of Justice and the social
contract tradition. It carries on the social contract tradition because it
models the ideal of an ideal, unforced agreement. On the other hand,
the device of the original position can also obscure the distance
between the idea of reasonable agreement-which is at the heart of
Rawls's view-and the idea of rational choice found in economics and
decision theory.2 4 The device must therefore be used with care and
precision, as its loose appropriation in support of instrumental and
economic views of tort law shows.25 It seems wise to avoid this danger
24. See Burton Dreben, On Rawls and Political Liberalism, in The Cambridge
Companion to Rawls 316 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003); T.M. Scanlon, Contractualism
and Utilitarianism, in Utilitarianism and Beyond 103 (Amartya Sen & Bernard
Williams eds., 1982).
25. Charles Fried & David Rosenberg, Making Tort Law: What Should Be Done
and Who Should Do It 13-36 (2003), and Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness
Versus Welfare 437-43 (2002), both deploy the idea of ex ante choice to support
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at the outset by steering clear of the original position and emphasizing

the distinctive ideas of reasonableness, fair social cooperation, and the
independence and equality of persons that characterize not just
Rawls's theory but the school of moral and political philosophy of

which it is part. It seems best to bring these ideas to bear by allowing
them to saturate our analysis of the fair distribution of accident costs
and letting the rich conceptions of fairness and reasonableness found
in our law of accidents react upon and reshape the philosophical ideas
that we are bringing to bear.26
We shall, therefore, bring Rawlsian ideas to bear directly, using

them to enrich our understanding of the ideals of fairness extant in
our law of accidents, and asking more informally when reasonable
people-concerned with distributing the costs of risky but mutually

beneficial activities fairly-would agree to a regime of negligence
liability and when they would agree to a regime of strict enterprise
liability.
Inquiring more informally involves comparing the

distribution of burdens and benefits between injurers and victims as
classes, and considering the reasons that they might advance in favor
of these competing distributions.
B. Fairnessand Choice of a Tort Regime
The tort law of accidents is now and long has been divided between
realms of negligence and realms of strict liability. The choice between

these rival principles of responsibility for harm done is, arguably, the
most fundamental choice in the law of torts. Particular conceptions of
liability-such as the enterprise liability conception of strict liabilityarticulate these regimes in specific ways.
But a general
characterization of the difference between these two principles of
responsibility can still be given. The essential distinction (in my
view 28) is that negligence liability criticizes conduct, whereas strict
highly economic interpretations of tort accident law, and invoke Rawls in support of
choosing ex ante.
26. At least one interpreter of Rawls has noted that the common law itself is a rich
source of ideas of reasonableness. See Dreben, supra note 24, at 316.
27. This procedure is similar to the procedure followed by the more general
contractualism of Tim Scanlon. See Thomas M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each
Other 189-247 (1998).
28. Although the division of the law of accidents between realms of negligence
and realms of strict liability is a longstanding one, how best to understand the
difference between these competing principles of responsibility remains a contested
matter among tort scholars. There are, for example, scholars who see strict liability as
essentially a surrogate kind of negligence liability, and scholars who see it as a distinct
and competitive form of liability. Jules Coleman and Richard Posner are among
those who see strict liability as an instrument for the realization of negligence aims.
See Coleman, supra note 10, at 226-28 (1992). Judge Posner's opinion in Konradi v.
United States, 919 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1990), and Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v.
American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990), illustrate this position as well.
Posner first articulated this view of strict liability as a servant of negligence objectives
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liability criticizes merely the failure to make reparation for harm

done. The imposition of negligence liability on a defendant condemns
the defendant's

conduct as

wrongful.

Negligent

conduct

is

unreasonable conduct; insufficiently careful conduct. Strict liability
does not condemn the conduct of the party who inflicted injury.
Rather, it condemns-calls unreasonable-only the failure to repair
the injury inflicted. Put differently, the fundamental difference
between strict and negligence liability is that under strict liability, the

payment of damages to those injured by the characteristic risks of an
activity is a condition for the legitimate conduct of an activity,29
whereas under negligence liability, the payment of damages is a

matter of redress for the wrongful infringement of the property and

physical integrity of others.30
The choice between negligence and strict liability is thus a choice

both between leaving nonnegligent accident costs-costs arising out of
risks reasonably imposed-on the victims who suffer them and
shifting such losses back to the injurers who inflict them, and between
reasons for imposing liability. Negligence is liability for unreasonable
risk imposition; strict liability is liability for reasonable risk imposition.

The reasonableness of preferring negligence to strict liability (and
vice-versa) depends on comparing burdens and benefits to injurers
and victims under these competing principles. On its face, negligence
places greater burdens on victims because negligence requires victims
to shoulder the costs of nonnegligent accidents, whereas strict liability
in Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29, 42-44 (1972)
(discussing respondeat superior). Guido Calabresi and Robert Keeton are among
those who see it a distinct and competitive kind of liability. Guido Calabresi, The
Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis 68-134 (1970); Keeton, supra
note 2. The best characterization of the distinction between the two forms of liability
may well depend in part on the best justification of the two forms of liability. The
characterization offered here should therefore be viewed as a contestable one.
29. Legal doctrine and rhetoric often come very close to putting the matter this
way. For example, Koos v. Roth, 652 P.2d 1255, 1262 (Or. 1982), a leading case on
abnormally dangerous activity liability, explains that, under strict liability, "the
question is not whether the activity threatens such harm that it should not be
continued. The question is who shall pay for harm that has been done." Loe v.
Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312, 317 (Or. 1961), explains the basis of abnormally dangerous
activity liability in language that comes even closer to the language of conditional
fault embraced in this Article: "The element of fault, if it can be called that, lies in the
deliberate choice by the defendant to inflict a high degree of risk upon his neighbor,
even though utmost care is observed in so doing." The Comment on Clause (c) to
Section 520, Abnormally Dangerous Activities, Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1977), observes:
The utility of [the injurer's] conduct may be such that he is socially justified
in proceeding with his activity, but the unavoidable risk of harm that is
inherent in it requires that it be carried on at his peril, rather than at the
expense of the innocent person who suffers harm as a result of it.
Id.
30. See Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise
Liability, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1266, 1308-12 (1997).
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places prima facie greater burdens on injurers, because strict liability
requires injurers to shoulder the costs of nonnegligent accidents.
Initially, then, we are asking when it is reasonable to place greater
burdens on victims and when it is reasonable to place greater burdens
on injurers.
1. Benchmarks of Fairness
Judgments regarding the fair distribution of the costs of
nonnegligent accidents do not arise in a vacuum. They arise against a
background of mutually beneficial cooperative conduct among equal
persons. Cooperative practices among equal persons give rise to
natural focal points, or benchmarks, of fair division. To see this,
consider the case for the difference principle in its simplest form.3 1
In its simplest form, the case for the difference principle depends on
(1) the general idea of society as a cooperative venture among equal
persons; and (2) particular features of the basic structure of society,
especially the pervasive effects that the basic structure has on the life
prospects of those who live under its institutions. Equal participants
in a system of social cooperation have prima facie claims to equal
shares of the system's benefits. Reasonable people, participating as
equals in a practice which creates both burdens and benefits, would
take equal division as the presumptively fair benchmark-the focal
point-from which their deliberations about the apportionment of
burdens and benefits of social cooperation should start. The "priority
of those worst off" which characterizes the difference principle-the
fact that the distribution of income and wealth has to be justified
especially to them-arises against this benchmark. The claims of
those worst off under institutions which permit economic inequalities
take on a certain priority, both because those worst off are receiving
less than equal shares of the benefits to which they have a prima facie
equal claim, and because principles governing permissible inequalities
of wealth and income with respect to the basic structure of society
have a pervasive and profound effect on the life prospects of those
subject to them.
Risks of physical injury likewise arise in the course of social
cooperation among equal persons. Equality of division is likewise the
presumptively fair benchmark when the burdens and benefits of those
practices affect those touched by them equally. But practices of risk
imposition rarely affect every member of society equally. 2 Risk of
31. See John Rawls, Justice As Fairness: A Restatement 122-26 (Erin Kelly ed.,
2001). See generally Joshua Cohen, DemocraticEquality, 99 Ethics 727 (1989).
32. Practices of risk imposition can have pervasive and profound effects on the life
prospects of those they endanger when they involve the imposition of significant risks
of death or devastating injury. When this is the case, stringent precautions for the
protection of those so endangered, analogous to the priority that the difference
principle gives to the claims of those worst off, are appropriate. See Gregory C.
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physical injury is pervasive in an advanced technological society, but
the activities which give rise to it are diverse and often quite
particular. The injuries that preoccupy accident law arise from a
variety of sources-from driving and flying; from milling, mining, and
manufacturing; from producing and consuming pharmaceuticals; and
from playing sports and playing with toys. These activities rarely
affect every member of society in equal ways. They tend to benefit
some more directly than they benefit others, and to burden some
more directly than they burden others.
The fact that most activities responsible for risks of physical injury
burden and benefit people differentially sets the subject matter of
accident law apart from the basic structure of society that is the
concern of Rawls's theory of justice. The basic structure of a society
has a pervasive and profound effect on the life prospects of every
member of society. Practices of risk imposition generally do not affect
every member of society equally and pervasively. Generally speaking,
practices of risk imposition-flying and driving, milling cotton and
refining gasoline-affect people in very different ways and to very
different degrees. This differential distribution of burdens and
benefits affects the natural focal point from which deliberation about
fair division begins. When the benefits of a practice are differentially
distributed, the presumptively fair way for equals to distribute the
burdens of that practice is in proportion to those differentially
distributed benefits. Those who benefit from the imposition of risks
should bear the costs of the accidents which result from those risks.
2. Risk Impositions Within and Between Communities
Because benefit and burden presumptively should be proportional,
it is useful to distinguish two fundamental kinds of cases where
practices of risk imposition distribute burden and benefit differently.
In the first kind of case, risk impositions occur within "communities of
risk."
In the second, risk impositions take place between
communities.
A "community of risk" is present in its strongest form when
potential injurers are also potential victims, and equally so. (In tort
law, the risks of the road are often taken to be a rough approximation
of a perfect community of risk.) Each member of the community has
her security compromised by having to bear risks imposed by others,
but each also has her liberty enhanced by being able to impose risks
on others. Within a community of risk, risks may be fairly imposed
and mutually beneficial in a particularly strong way. When each
Keating, PressingPrecaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification,56 Vand. L. Rev.
653, 697-717 (2003). But it is the existence of pervasive effects on a discernible class
of potential victims that is critical in these cases, not the existence of equal and
pervasive effects on every member of society.
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member of a community is equally a potential injurer and a potential
victim, risks will be fairly imposed: Each member of the community
will be exposed to equal risks by each other member of the
community, and will impose equivalent risks on each other member of
the community. (In an idealized community of the highway, for
instance, each driver will be equally at risk and equally putting others
at risk.) If the risks imposed are reasonable ones-if the freedom to
impose the risks is worth more than the foregone security that is its
price-then each member of the community will also benefit from the
right to impose those risks. (Each driver will gain more from the
mundane freedom to take his or her car on the road, for example,
than he or she loses from having to bear the risks created by the
presence of other cars on the road.) Within a perfect community of
risk, the burdens and benefits of accidental risk imposition are fairly
distributed because they are equally distributed. In a community of
equals, equal division is prima facie fair-prima facie reasonable.
Risks are imposed by members of one community on members of
another community when potential injurers and potential victims
engage in distinct activities, which do not impose equivalent risks on
one another. When potential injurers play cricket and potential
victims walk through their yards,33 members of one community
(cricket players) are imposing greater risks on members of the other
community (homeowners or pedestrians), and bearing less in the way34
of exposure to risk. When one party mills and the other party mines,
because water is a resource for milling and a detriment to mining, the
milling party is imposing greater risk on the mining party and bearing
less in the way of exposure to risk. Even if the risks that the cricket
players and the millers impose are reasonable, the burdens and
benefits of those risks are not fairly distributed.
Practices of risk imposition which are intermediate between these
two poles are both easy to conjure up and common. For example,
given the importance that driving has to our daily lives (this from
someone who lives in Los Angeles), we may all stand to benefit from
the practice of transporting large quantities of gasoline over the roads
in tanker trucks, even though this method of transport creates risks of
massive explosion, and even though most of us never expect to make
use of the legal right to transport gasoline in this manner. 5 Residents
of Manhattan, for example, generally gain nothing of value from the
right to haul gasoline by tanker truck. Indeed, they may drive so
infrequently that they gain far less than Angelenos do from this

33. Bolton v. Stone, 1951 A.C. 850 (appeal taken from C.A.).
34. Fletcher v. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1866), affd 3 L.R.-E. & I. App.
330 (H.L. 1868) (appeal taken from Ex.).
35. The transport of gasoline in this manner precipitated the death of the victim in
Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1182 (Wash. 1972).

20041

THE LAW OFACCIDENTS

1875

method of transporting gasoline.36 But even Manhattanites may
benefit indirectly from the enterprise of transporting gasoline by
tanker trucks, even if they do not impose risks on gasoline tankers
equivalent to the risks that gasoline tankers impose on them, and even
if they benefit less than Angelenos. Their life prospects may be
improved by virtue of the prosperity created and sustained by the
practice of transporting gasoline by tanker trucks, and even
Manhattanites may benefit from the use of private automobiles that
the practice enables.
In all of these cases, the fairest-most reasonable-distribution of
the costs of accidents is open to argument. But the antecedent
distribution of burdens and benefits by a practice of risk imposition
bears on deliberations of fairness in an important way.
The
antecedent distribution of burdens and benefits by a practice of risk
imposition sets the benchmark or focal point from which deliberations
about fair distribution begin.
It is presumptively reasonablepresumptively fair-for the burdens of a risky activity to be borne by
those who benefit from it. Prima facie, burden and benefit should be
proportional. Prima facie, losses should be shifted if their shifting
would improve the distribution of burden and benefit. And this is
(prima facie) true even if the risks which resulted in those losses were
reasonably imposed.
Let us retrace our steps. Reasonableness requires (1) taking the
impact of one's conduct on other people into account as a
circumstance capable of influencing one's decisions; and (2) being
prepared to govern one's conduct on a basis acceptable to others
affected by one's conduct. Reasonable people seek to cooperate on
fair terms with other equal, independent, and reasonable people. Fair
terms enable each person to pursue his or her own aims and ends on
terms that all those affected can accept. When risks of physical injury
are at issue, the terms on which risks are permissibly imposed and
accident costs distributed reconcile competing claims of liberty and
security. Liberty and security are institutional conditions which
enable people with diverse aims and ends to realize those ends,
whatever they happen to be. A substantial measure of each is
necessary for people to realize their particular plans and aspirations.
The predicament of accident law is that, when risks of physical injury
are at stake, liberty and security conflict and the task of accident law is

36. It is tempting to think that they are also exposed to proportionately less risk
from this practice of transporting gasoline, so that their lesser benefit is matched by
lesser burden. But it is not clear to me that they are at much less risk from the
practice. Tractor trailers towing gasoline may create risks of especially great harm in
the confined quarters and crowded spaces of Manhattan, even if there are fewer
trucks traveling through this area. The risks posed by tractor trailers hauling gasoline
may not diminish commensurately with the frequency of tractor trailer trips.
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to reconcile liberty and security on terms that are fair and therefore
acceptable to those they affect.
Presumptively, fair terms of cooperation are equal terms. In a
cooperative venture among equal persons, it is prima facie fair to
distribute burdens and benefits equally. Equal persons should be
entitled to impose equal risks on one another, and to share equally in
the benefits and burdens of risk impositions. Deliberation about the
fair terms of cooperation begins from this starting point. Deliberation
about the fair distribution of accident costs, however, moves away
from the benchmark of equal division, because practices of risk
imposition generally benefit and burden those they affect
differentially. When burden and benefit are distributed differentially
by a practice of risk imposition, proportionality of benefit and
burden-not equality of benefit and burden-is the natural focal point
or benchmark from which deliberation over fairness begins. Prima
facie, burdens should be shared in proportion to benefits.
When accident law chooses between regimes of negligence and
strict liability, it is primarily choosing between alternative
distributions of the costs of accidents which arise from reasonable risk
impositions and therefore should not be prevented. Strict liability and
negligence differ primarily in their allocation of the costs of
nonnegligent accidents-or so I shall assume for purposes of this
Article. Strict liability shifts those costs back onto injurers; negligence
leaves those costs on the victims of nonnegligent accidents. Prima
facie, the fairness of these regimes depends on whether they bring
burden and benefit into alignment with one another.
The prima facie clause in the claim made in the last paragraph is
important, for two reasons. First, the choice between negligence and
strict liability does have precautionary effects, and those
precautionary effects themselves raise questions of fairness. Indeed,
in my view, the most pressing questions of fairness arise when risks
threaten irreparable injury or death, so that fairness cannot be
achieved after the fact by making reparation for harm done. When
risk impositions threaten severe irreparable injury, it is therefore
essential that strict liability induce appropriately great precaution.
Irreparable injury cannot be made right after the fact. Justice must be
done at the time risk is imposed, by taking sufficiently stringent
precautions-or not at all.37
The "all things considered" fairness of a liability regime thus
depends both on its precautionary effects and on the way that it
distributes the costs of those accidents which should not be prevented.
The assumption that I am making-that the precautionary effects of
strict liability are, in general, at least as fair and as beneficial as those
of negligence-is, I believe, a reasonable assumption. The rhetoric
37. For a discussion of this, see generally Keating, supra note 32.
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and rationale of both statutory and common law strict liability
generally makes the same assumption-that the risks being subjected
to strict liability are ones which it is reasonable to impose.38 There
are, moreover, good reasons to think that common law rhetoric is
right on this score. Economic analysis teaches us that strict liability
generally induces greater precaution than negligence liability, because
it induces potential injurers to adjust the frequency or intensity with
which they conduct their activities, as well as the care with which they
do so. 39 The fact that strict liability places ultimate responsibility in
the hands of potential injurers for choosing between letting accidents
happen and preventing them from happening, whereas negligence
liability places that responsibility in the hands of juries and judges,4" is
further reason to think that strict liability will usually induce more
effective precaution than negligence liability does. Potential injurers
are likely to have greater expertise with respect to the risks of their
activities, and so are likely to be better at devising and executing
appropriate precautions. We therefore have good reason to suppose
that strict liability will induce more stringent precaution against risks
of devastating injury than negligence liability will.4
To be sure, the assumption that strict liability will generally induce
appropriate precaution is an assumption, and it only holds true
generally. In some circumstances, strict liability probably induces
excessive precaution. The imposition of common law strict liability on
recreational activities would most likely be undesirable for this
reason. 42
In other circumstances, negligence liability may be
appropriate because we have reason to induce more intense victim
precaution. In yet other circumstances, strict liability may fail to
induce sufficient precautions, and may induce less precaution than
negligence liability. This is a recurring worry with respect to no-fault
automobile insurance, a form of strict enterprise liability implemented
by the mechanism of victim loss insurance. 43
Even so-even
acknowledging the existence of these exceptions-there is good
reason to assume that common law rhetoric is right to suppose that
strict liability is usually at least as effective as negligence in inducing
appropriate precaution.
We shall therefore proceed on that
assumption.
38. George Fletcher notes this as well. See Fletcher, supra note 4, at 543-44
(making this point and citing common law evidence in support of it).
39. See Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 21-31 (1987)
[hereinafter Shavell, Economic Analysis]. See generally Steven Shavell, Strict Liability
Versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980) [hereinafter Shavell, Strict Liability].
40. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 Yale L.J. 1055 (1972).
41. See Keating, supra note 32 (discussing the stringent precaution against
significant risks of devastating injury that fairness requires).
42. See infra text accompanying note 137.
43. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
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There is, however, a second reason to recognize that the "all things
considered" desirability of an accident law regime is not settled solely
by the fairness of the way that it distributes the costs of accidents:
Considerations of fairness in the distribution of accident costs do not
have automatic priority over other normative considerations which
bear on the law of accidents.
The basic reason that Rawls gives for the priority of the claims of
justice over those of efficiency-that the choice of the principles and
institutions for the basic structure of society has a pervasive effect on
the life prospects of those persons who live under them-does not
apply with comparable force to less encompassing institutions such as
the institutions of accident law. Within the law of accidents, an
analogous priority of fairness arises only when risks of severe,
irreparable injury-risks of death or devastation-are at issue.
Severe, irreparable injury has a pervasive and irreversible effect on
the lives of those upon whom it lights, either ending their lives entirely
or scarring them permanently. The power and pervasiveness of these
effects make the claims of those put in peril of such harm especially
urgent.44
When we are thinking about the general choice between regimes of
strict liability and negligence, however, there is no class of persons
whose claims have special urgency in the way that the claims of those
least advantaged with respect to the basic structure of society or the
claims of those whose lives stand to be devastated by risks of death or
devastating injury have special urgency. The assumption behind strict
enterprise liability is that fairness can generally be done after the fact
by the payment of money damages to those physically injured at the
hands of an enterprise's "characteristic risks." This assumes that the
injuries inflicted are generally not severe and irreparable. When
injuries are severe and irreparable, fair distribution cannot be fully
realized after the fact. Death is the canonical case of a harm that
cannot be dispersed and distributed across those who benefited from
the risk responsible for it.
The case for the priority of fairness over competing valuesefficiency, for instance-therefore has a different source and strength.
Whatever priority fairness has stems not from the special urgency of
the claims of some of those affected by the risks at issue, but from
what Martin Stone has felicitously called "the unity of doing and
suffering."4 5 When people act for their own advantage and benefit
44. See generally Keating, supra note 32.
45. See Martin Stone, On the Idea of Private Law, 9 Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence
235, 247 (1996). The "unity of doing and suffering" is often taken to argue against all
forms of strict liability and in favor of negligence liability, with a very strict criterion
of actual causation. See Weinrib, supra note 10, at 145-203; Ernest J. Weinrib, The
InsuranceJustificationand PrivateLaw, 14 J. Legal Stud. 681, 683 (1985) (arguing that
insurance or cost-shifting rationales have no place in the justification of liability rules
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from the impositions of risks which harm others, they single
themselves out as specially responsible for the harm involved-both
because they have acted and because they have benefited. The fact
that someone who has neither acted to impose a risk on others, nor
benefited from the imposition of that risk, might be the best party to
disperse the costs of the harms arising out of that risk is a far more
dubious and problematic basis of responsibility.46 People have reason
to reject outright principles of responsibility for harm done which
predicate responsibility simply on the ability of an agent to realize a
socially desirable end. Principles of responsibility which turn on
voluntary agency and receipt of benefit are, by contrast, prima facie
candidates for reasonable acceptance.
Fairness thus has a strong claim to be-as Judge Friendly says in Ira
S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States-an "overarching principle"
which trumps the claims of efficiency when they transgress the bounds
of fair responsibility. Within those boundaries, however, there is no
reason to suppose that fairness has some absolute priority over other
normative claims, be they claims of efficiency or of right. The final
part of this Article considers how the competing normative claims of
property rights, free choice, and even of intangible social goods may
alter or displace the claims of fairness.47 Lastly, it is also worth
observing that within the outer boundaries fixed by considerations of
agency and benefit, the claims of fairness and efficiency cooperate as
well as compete. Bushey itself is a case in point. Two basic aspects of
efficiency-accident avoidance and loss distribution-point in
opposite directions so far as the imposition of liability is concerned.
The end of efficient precaution is best furthered by leaving the loss on
the plaintiff, whereas the end of efficient loss distribution is best
furthered by pinning the loss on the defendant.4" Fairness favors
pinning the loss on the defendant, thereby converging on the same

because they do not grow out of the parties' relationship as doer and sufferer of the
same harms). I believe this view mistaken, but I cannot discuss the matter here. In
my view, what counts so far as the "unity of doing and suffering" is concerned is the
moral relationship between injurer and victim-the relationships of agency and
benefit described in the text.
46. The great case law statement of this point is Judge Friendly's opinion in Ira S.
Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968):
It is true, of course, that in many cases the plaintiff will not be in a position
to insure, and so expansion of liability will, at the very least, serve respondeat
superior's loss spreading function. But the fact that the defendant is better
able to afford damages is not alone sufficient to justify legal responsibility,
and this overarching principle must be taken into account in deciding
whether to expand the reach of respondeatsuperior.
Id. at 171 (citations omitted); see Keeton, supra note 2 (arguing that loss-spreading
concerns almost never account for the imposition of tort liability and distinguishing
such concerns from the fair apportionment of burdens and benefits).
47. See infra Part IV.C.
48. Bushey, 398 F.2d at 170-71.
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More
conclusion as the policy of efficient loss distribution.49
generally, when risks are reparable by the payment of money
damages-when the harm done can be undone by the payment of
adequate compensation-efficient precaution complements fair
reparation. When harm is fully compensable-fully rectifiable by the
payment of money damages-fairness can be achieved after injury is
inflicted by redistributing accident costs from victims to injurers.
Efficient precaution-taking cost-justified precaution and only costjustified precaution-is both consistent with fairness and conducive to
its realization. Efficient precaution is consistent with fairness because
fairness can be done after the fact of injury by the payment of money
damages. Efficient precaution is conducive to the realization of
fairness because efficient precaution maximizes the resources
available for reparation.
With this background in mind, let us reconstruct the reciprocity of
risk criterion as a Rawlsian account of when negligence is more
reasonable than strict liability, and vice-versa.
II. THE RECIPROCITY OF RISK CRITERION

The basic claim of the reciprocity of risk criterion is that negligence
is appropriate when risks are reciprocal once reasonable care is
exercised, whereas strict liability is appropriate when risks are not
reciprocal once reasonable care is exercised. Because strict liability
and negligence express different judgments about the conduct to
which they apply, this claim implicitly asserts that the payment of
money damages to the victim of a risk is rightly conceived as redress
for wrongful infringement of the victim's security by unreasonable
conduct when the initial distribution of risk is reciprocal, and rightly
conceived as a condition for the legitimate conduct of an activity (and
paid whenever the activity issues in a "characteristic harm") when the
initial distribution of risk is nonreciprocal.
A. Fairnessas Reciprocity of Risk
The central idea of the reciprocity of risk criterion is that negligence
liability fairly apportions the burdens and benefits of risky activities
within a community of reasonable risk imposition, whereas strict
liability does so when risks are imposed by one community on

49. Bushey involved the flooding of a dry dock by a drunken sailor returning to
his ship from shore leave. Id. at 169-70. The end of efficient precaution was best
served by leaving the loss on the dry dock, because that would encourage the dry
dock to install automatic locks on the valves controlling the flooding and draining of
the dock. See id. at 170-71. The end of efficient loss distribution was best served by
pinning the loss on the Coast Guard-the larger enterprise. See id. at 171. Fairness
favored placing the loss on the Coast Guard because it benefitted from the practiceshore leave-responsible for the accident. See id. at 171-72.
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another.5" Recall that a "community of risk," in its strongest form, is
one whose members impose identical risks of harm on one another,
thereby imposing and being exposed to equivalent risks.
A
community of reasonable risk imposition is one whose members
impose only risks that confer more in the way of benefits on those
who impose them than they inflict in the way of burdens on those who
are exposed to them. A speed limit of sixty is more reasonable than a
speed limit of thirty when-and only when-the freedom to drive
thirty miles an hour faster is worth more than the increased risk of
injury that accompanies that increase in speed. When risks are
reciprocal, then, each person relinquishes an equal amount of security
and gains an equal amount of freedom. When reasonable risks are
reciprocal, each member of the community that imposes and is
exposed to them: (1) relinquishes an equal amount of freedom; (2)
gains an equal amount of security; and (3) gains more in the way of
freedom than they lose in the way of security.
Once due care has been exercised, reciprocity of risk thus defines a
community of equal freedom and mutual benefit. Reciprocity of risk
defines a community of equal freedom because reciprocity exists when
risks are equal in probability and gravity. When risks are equal in
these respects, persons relinquish equal amounts of security and gain
equal amounts of liberty. Reciprocity of risk defines a community of
mutual benefit because each person gains more in freedom than she
loses in security, and because-when risks are reasonable-each
person's freedom of action is equally benefited and each person's
security is equally burdened. Subjecting reasonable reciprocal risks to
strict liability increases neither freedom nor fairness because strict
liability bears only on the distribution of nonnegligent accident costs."
It does not improve the fairness of the distribution of the burdens and
benefits of risk imposition because its adoption simply "substitute[s]
one form of risk for another-the risk of liability for the risk of

personal loss.52
Matters are different when risks remain nonreciprocal even though
injurers exercise due care. Strict liability properly applies to risks that
are reasonable but nonreciprocal. The imposition of nonreciprocal
risks is appropriate when those risks are to the long run advantage of
the prospective victims that they imperil, but not mutually beneficial
in the strong sense that reciprocal risks are. The greater-than-normal
risks imposed by transporting thousands of gallons of gasoline in
tanker trucks53 illustrate this circumstance. Given the importance of
driving in our daily lives, each of us may benefit from the transport of
50. See generally Fletcher, supra note 4.
51. Or so Fletcher's paper implies. See id. This is a legitimate simplifying
assumption, which this Article also accepts.
52. Id. at 547.
53. See Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1185 (Wash. 1972).
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thousands of gallons of gasoline over the roads in gasoline tanker
trucks, even though this method of transporting gasoline creates risks
of massive explosion, and even though most of us never expect to
make use of the legal right to transport vast quantities of gasoline in
this manner. But we are not benefited to the extent that we would be
if we all routinely drove such vehicles ourselves. The right to impose
the greater-than-normal risks of driving gasoline tankers is not one
that most of us find valuable. It follows, therefore, that the
prospective victims of nonreciprocal risk impositions are not fully
compensated for bearing these risks by the right to impose equal risks
in turn. The imposition of such nonreciprocal risks is not part of a
normal life, and the value of the right to impose such risks does not
offset the disvalue of being exposed to them.
Subjecting nonreciprocal risks to strict liability offsets this
unfairness, insofar as ex post compensation can redress the harms that
victims suffer. By ensuring that those injured by nonreciprocal risk
impositions are-so far as possible-fully compensated for their
injuries, strict liability effects a more robust mutuality of benefit. Risk
is unfairly distributed ex ante, but the costs of accidents issuing from
those risks are fairly distributed ex post. The damages paid under
strict liability are, then, not redress for wrongful infringement of
another's security, but a way of making the distribution of the burdens
and benefits of nonreciprocal risks more fair than it would otherwise
be. The payment of damages makes reasonable nonreciprocal risk
impositions work to the greatest advantage of those who have most
reason to object to them-namely, those who benefit only indirectly
from them and whose lives, limbs, and property are injured by them.
Without damages, victims would still be better off bearing reasonable
nonreciprocal risks than forbidding them, because reasonable
nonreciprocal risks are to the long run advantage of those they
imperil. But they are better off yet if they are compensated in the
event that the imposition of those risks injures them. Absent
reparation by injurers, victims must, at best, draw on their own
resources to repair the harm that they have suffered; reparation spares
them this expense.
The payment of compensation to the victims of accidents issuing
from reasonable but not reciprocal risk impositions is thus a condition
for the legitimate conduct of activities whose reasonable risks are
nonreciprocal, not redress for harm wrongly inflicted. Reasonable
nonreciprocal risks are not mutually beneficial-are not fair-in the
strong sense that reasonable reciprocal risks are, because the benefits
of reasonable nonreciprocal risks are captured by many and their
burdens borne by few. Negligence liability does nothing to rectify this
unfairness, because it leaves nonnegligent accident costs concentrated
on those unfortunate enough to have suffered them. Strict liability
does rectify this unfairness by shifting the costs of nonreciprocal risks
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of impositions back onto those who impose them and so benefit the
most from imposing them.
This account of the proper division of labor between negligence and
strict liability is appealing in part because it is both responsive to the
fact that fault liability involves criticism of conduct, whereas nonfault
liability criticizes only the failure to make reparation, and offers a
justification for that distinction. When risks are reasonable and
reciprocal, negligent conduct is objectionable for two reasons. First,
because negligent conduct involves the imposition of a nonreciprocal
risk, it disrupts the fair equilibrium of risk. Second, because negligent
conduct involves the imposition of an unreasonable risk, negligent
conduct is objectionable in a way that conduct whose benefits and
burdens are unfairly distributed need not be. When a speed limit of
sixty is taken to fix the upper boundary of reasonably safe driving so
far as speed is concerned, the judgment being made is that hurtling
down the road in a machine capable of inflicting great injury at a
higher speed is a game not worth its candle. In this setting, the risks of
driving seventy-five are not just nonreciprocal. They unjustifiably
endanger, and would so even if they became reciprocal.
The conduct which gives rise to negligence liability is
objectionable-unreasonable-because it does not show sufficient
regard for the security of others. Negligence liability therefore
involves the criticism of conduct; it faults conduct, and properly so.
Negligence liability properly criticizes conduct because insufficiently
careful conduct strikes an unreasonable balance between the injurer's
own interest in being free to impose risk on others and the victim's
security.
When risks are nonreciprocal in the way that the risks of
transporting gasoline by tanker trucks are nonreciprocal, the
underlying conduct is not unjustifiable or unreasonable. Quite the
contrary, a society as dependent on private automobile transportation
as ours needs gasoline, and thus needs to have it transported to gas
stations. The practice of transporting it is justifiable. Strict liability is
imposed not because the conduct is objectionable, but because
negligence liability distributes the burdens and benefits of the conduct
unfairly. Under negligence liability, the lion's share of the benefits are
reaped by those who own and operate gasoline tankers, lesser benefits
are reaped (in varying degrees) by the rest of us, and the burdens of
the activity are borne by an unlucky few whose fate it is to be
immolated by the infrequent explosions that are the inevitable cost of
the practice. The only "fault" lies in the failure to make reparation to
the unlucky few who bear the burdens of the activity. Strict liability
restores mutuality of benefit, so far as possible. It makes those who
suffer physical injury at the hands of the practice whole, to the extent
that can be done. The payment of damages through strict liability
does not express a condemnation of the conduct involved in the
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infliction of injury, it merely ensures that the activity is conducted on
fair terms.
B. Risk and Injury
Is the reciprocity of risk criterion's claim to fairness convincing?
For a liability rule to be prima facie fair, the rule must distribute the
burdens of the risks that it regulates proportionately with the benefits
of those risks. If, for example, every member of a community benefits
equally from the right to impose a risk, every member of that
community ought to bear an equal share of the burdens of that riskof the accidental injury and death it inflicts. Disproportionate
distributions of burdens and benefits are presumptively unfair. Are
fully reciprocal risks fair then? The answer is that perfect reciprocity
of risk defines a fair situation with respect to the distribution of risk.
When risks are fully reciprocal each member of the community of risk
is equally benefited by the right to impose risks similar to those they
must bear, and equally threatened by the risk impositions that they
must bear. The reciprocity of risk criterion does not, however, define
a fair distribution of harm, and the distribution of harm is more
important than the distribution of risk. It is the ripening of risk into
harm-not the chance of such ripening-that is the real burden of
risk.
Risk rarely impairs the ability to pursue a conception of the good
over the course of a complete life. It is harm-physical injury and
death-that wreaks havoc with people's lives.54 Risk can be fairly
distributed, even when the costs of the accidental harm which results
from that risk is unfairly concentrated, and the distribution of harm
matters more than the distribution of risk. Fairness requires that
those who benefit equally from the imposition of a risk share equally
in the burden of that risk-the loss of life, limb, and property that is
its cost. The presence of reciprocal risk thus does not ensure that
harm is fairly distributed. For harm to be fairly distributed, reciprocity
of harm must be present. Baron Bramwell's famous "live and let live"
rule in nuisance law illustrates reciprocity of harm:
The instances put during the argument, of burning weeds, emptying
cess-pools, making noises during repairs, and other instances which
would be nuisances if done wantonly or maliciously, nevertheless
may be lawfully done. It cannot be said that such acts are not
nuisances, because, by the hypothesis, they are; and it cannot be
54. To be sure, there are special cases where exposure to risk is itself a kind of
harm. Exposure to carcinogenic toxins and radiation can result in risks of harm that
persist long after the exposure ends, and this may count as a harm in itself. See, e.g., In
re TMI, 67 F.3d 1103 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that exposure to radiation beyond a
certain threshold fixed by regulation constitutes a harm regardless of subsequent
personal injury). But these are exceptional, and distinctively modern, cases. Fletcher
clearly has more typical (and traditional) cases in mind.
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doubted that, if a person maliciously and without cause made close
to a dwelling-house the same offensive smells as may be made in
emptying a cesspool, an action would lie. Nor can these cases be got
rid of as extreme cases, because such cases properly test a principle.
Nor can it be said that the jury settle such questions by finding there
is no nuisance, though there is.... There must be, then, some
principle on which such cases must be excepted. It seems to me that
that principle may be deduced from the character of these cases, and
is this, viz., that those acts necessary for the common and ordinary
use and occupation of land and houses may be done, if conveniently
done, without subjecting those who do them to an action.... There
is an obvious necessity for such a principle as I have mentioned. It is
as much for the advantage of one owner as of another; for the very
nuisance the one complains of, as the result of the ordinary use of
his neighbour's land, he himself will create in the ordinary use of his
own, and the reciprocal nuisances are of a comparatively trifling
character. The convenience of such a rule may be indicated by
calling it a rule of give and take, live and let live .... 55
When, in "the common and ordinary use and occupation" of the
land and houses, neighbors expose each other to modest interferences
with each others' use and enjoyment of property, harm is fairly
distributed. When, however, in the ordinary use of the roads, drivers
expose each other to similar risks of injury, harm is not likely to be
fairly distributed. Fortunately, serious automobile accidents are not
so frequent that drivers can routinely expect to be the victims of a
nonnegligent accident issuing in serious physical injury one month and
to precipitate a nonnegligent accident issuing in serious physical injury
the next month. The risks of the road may be fairly distributedbecause they are reciprocal-but the nonnegligent harms that issue
from those risks are not fairly distributed under a regime of
negligence liability. Negligence liability lets those losses lie where
they fall, and they fall unevenly.
The relative infrequency of serious automobile accidents appears to
be a typical feature of the activities governed by the tort law of
accidents.
(The subject matter of accident law proper differs
fundamentally from the subject matter of nuisance law in this respect.
Nuisance law is centrally concerned with continuous invasions, with
ongoing interferences with the use and enjoyment of property.56 ) Tort
accident law addresses sudden explosions of standing risks into
substantial physical injuries. The collapse of Rylands's reservoir in

55. Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 32-33 (Ex. Ch. 1862).
56. See, e.g., Wheat v. Freeman Coal Mining Corp., 319 N.E.2d 290 (Ill. App. Ct.
1974) (concluding that constant invasion by coal dust and smoke from defendant's
mining operation constituted a nuisance); O'Cain v. O'Cain, 473 S.E.2d 460 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1996) (concluding that constant odors and flies from defendant's hog farming
operation constituted a nuisance).
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Rylands v. Fletcher,7 is a typical example; the severing of the
plaintiff's leg and foot in Davis v. ConsolidatedRail Corp.5 8 is another;

the immolation of the plaintiff by the overturning of the gasoline
tanker in Siegler v. Kuhlman59 is a third. This relative infrequency of
injury-especially of nonnegligent injury-undermines the argument
that reciprocity of risk defines a fair situation. When harm is
infrequent, the ordinary conduct of an activity will not ensure that
those who suffer nonnegligent injuries at one point inflict them shortly
thereafter, or vice-versa. Reciprocity of risk will not guarantee
reciprocity of harm.
To be sure, the relative infrequency of injury responsible for
making harm nonreciprocal even when risk is reciprocal is a good
thing. A world in which people suffered serious physical injuries in
automobile accidents one month, and inflicted them through
automobile accidents the next month, would be a world in which life
would be "nasty, brutish, and short."6 What, then, is the fairer
alternative to reciprocity of risk if reciprocity of harm is neither
possible nor desirable? The law of accidents offers an answer and it is
that answer-that the costs of harm, if not harm itself, may be fairly
distributed by the enterprise form of strict liability-to which we must
now turn.
11. DISTRIBUTING THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTAL HARM FAIRLY
A. The Fairnessof Enterprise Liability

The theory of enterprise liability asserts that: (1) accident costs
should be internalized by the activity responsible for them; and (2)
accident costs should be dispersed and distributed among the
participants in that activity. Within the law of torts, enterprise liability
flowers most fully as a form of strict liability. It has ebbed and flowed
throughout the course of the twentieth century but, even when it ebbs,
its influence can be found in vicarious liability cases, in abnormally
dangerous activity liability cases, and in product liability cases.6 1 The
core idea of fairness embodied by enterprise liability is an idea of
fairness in the distribution of harm, namely, the idea that the burdens
57. 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868) (appeal taken from Ex.).
58. 788 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff, a railroad worker, had crawled
underneath a parked train to inspect it and had one leg severed just below the knee,
and most of the foot on the other leg sliced off when the train that he was inspecting
moved without warning. Id. at 1262.
59. 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972).
60. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 186 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968)
(1651).
61. See Keating, supra note 30, at 1287-95. Enterprise liability conceptions do,
however, sometimes surface within negligence law. See Gregory C. Keating, The
Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 Vand. L. Rev.
1285, 1329-33 (2001).

2004]

THE LAW OFACCIDENTS

1887

of accidental injury should be distributed across those who benefit
from the risks which result in those injuries.
Enterprise liability thus makes a claim that Fletcher rejects-that
the imposition of strict liability on reciprocal risks will distribute the
burdens and benefits of risky activities more fairly than negligence
liability does. Fletcher remarks that "[w]here the risks are reciprocal
among the relevant parties,... a rule of strict liability does no more
than substitute one form of risk for another-the risk of liability for
the risk of personal loss."62 The plain implication of this remark is
that the fair distribution of losses arising out of reciprocal risks is
beyond the reach of tort law; the imposition of strict liability on
reciprocal risks merely shifts concentrated harm. Enterprise liability
insists otherwise-that the imposition of strict liability distributes an
otherwise concentrated loss fairly, by dispersing that loss across those
who benefit from the activity out of which it arose. We are at an
impasse. The roots of that impasse lie in unstated empirical
assumptions: Fletcher's theory and the theory of enterprise liability
assume different social worlds.63 Excavating the competing empirical
assumptions is essential both to grasping the theories and to escaping
the impasse in which we find ourselves.
1. Two Social Worlds
The assumption which divides Fletcher and enterprise liability is
gestured at by one of Oliver Wendell Holmes's more famous turns of
phrase. Writing in 1897, Holmes observed that "[o]ur law of torts
comes from the old days of isolated, ungeneralized wrongs, assaults,
slanders, and the like," whereas "the torts with which our courts are
kept busy to-day are mainly the incidents of certain well known
businesses.., railroads, factories, and the like. ' Implicit in Holmes's
remark is a distinction not just between two kinds of accidents, but
between two kinds of social worlds. Stylizing and simplifying, we can
call these two worlds the "world of acts" and the "world of activities,"
respectively. The "world of acts" is Holmes's world of "isolated,
ungeneralized wrongs." The "world of activities" is the world in
which accidents are the "incidents" of organized enterprises.
In the "world of acts," risks are discrete. The typical actor is an
individual or a small firm which creates risk so infrequently that harm
is not likely to materialize from any single actor's conduct. The
typical accident materializes out of the activity of isolated, unrelated
actors, acting independently (i.e., natural persons or small firms
62. Fletcher, supra note 4, at 547.
63. The importance of such assumptions is stressed in Henry J. Steiner, Moral
Argument and Social Vision in the Courts (1987).
64. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 167,
183 (1920). The paper itself was originally delivered in 1897.
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separately engaging in activities on an occasional basis). Taken as a
whole, the activities of these individual actors are diffuse and
disorganized, and quite possibly actuarially small. The dogfight that
precipitated Brown v. Kendall65 is a representative tort in this world:
It arose out of a chance encounter between unrelated parties, neither
of whose activities were large enough to make such misfortunes
commonplace and expected. In the "world of acts," then, risks are
isolated, "one-shot" events. Harm, when it materializes, is an
accidental misfortune.
Because actors are small, and risks
independent and uncorrelated, liability rules shift, but do not spread,
losses. In this world, the imposition of strict liability on reciprocal
risks merely "substitute[s] one form of risk for another-the risk of
liability for the risk of personal loss," as Fletcher says.66 A fair
distribution of the costs of accidents-of harm-is hard to come by
because the distribution of the costs of accidents across the activities
that generate them depends upon the underlying activity satisfying
basic criteria of insurability. Foremost among these criteria is the law
of large numbers.67 But, in the purest form of the "world of acts,"
both actors and activities are small.
At the opposite pole from the "world of acts" is the "world of
activities." In the "world of activities," risks are generalized and
systemic. Systemic risks arise out of a continuously repeated activity
(the manufacturing of Coke bottles, the transportation of gasoline, the
supplying of water by a utility) that is actuarially large. "Accidental"
harm is statistically certain to result from such risks: If you make
enough Coke bottles some are sure to rupture; 68 if you transport
enough gasoline, some tankers are sure to explode;6 9 if you leave
water mains uninspected in the ground long enough, some are sure to
break;7" if you turn loose enough sailors on shore leave, some of them
are bound to return to their ships drunk and wreak havoc.71 In the
"world of activities," both actors and activities are large. The cost of
accidents can therefore be dispersed and distributed.
65. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
66. Fletcher, supra note 4, at 547.
67. See Tort and Accident Law, supra note 1, at 728-29.
68. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
69. See Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972).
70. See Lubin v. Iowa City, 131 N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 1964). The waterworks chose
not to replace mains until they broke because it was inefficient to inspect the mains
for signs of incipient breakage and replace them before they broke.
71. The suit in the Bushey case, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968), arose out of an
incident in which a drunken sailor, returning from shore leave late at night to his
Coast Guard ship, which was being overhauled in a floating dry dock, opened the
valves and flooded the dry dock causing the dry dock to sink and the ship to partially
sink. The court, in an opinion by Judge Friendly, affirmed that the conduct was
within the scope of employment, because the risk of drunkenness was a risk increased
by the Coast Guard's "long-run activity in spite of all reasonable precautions" on its
part, and hence was fairly charged to the Coast Guard. Id. at 171.
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In the "world of activities," the typical injury arises not out of the
diffuse and disorganized acts of unrelated individuals or small firms,
but out of the organized activities of firms that are either large
themselves, or are small parts of relatively well-organized enterprises.
The defendant in Lubin v. Iowa City (a case where a waterworks left
water mains uninspected until they broke) is large in the first sense: A
single entity is responsible for the piping of water through
underground pipes throughout a city, for laying and maintaining those
pipes, for charging consumers for the water so transported, and so on.
The transportation of large quantities of gasoline in tanker trucks on
highways is large in the second sense: The firms that do the
transporting may (or may not be) small and specialized, but they are
enmeshed in contractual relationships with those who manufacture
and refine the gasoline, those who operate gasoline stations, those
who manufacture tractor trailers, and so on.
In the "world of activities," accidental harms can be spread across
the enterprises that engender those harms. When the law of large
numbers is met, risks are not only certain to issue in harms, they are
also very likely to issue in harms with predictable regularity. When
activities are actuarially large, the accidents that they engender will
likewise be predictable and regular, and the costs of those accidents
can be factored into the costs of conducting the enterprise. The costs
of manufacturing and distributing Coke can include the costs of
injuries from exploding Coke bottles; the costs of supplying water to
households and businesses can include the costs of the damage caused
by broken water mains.
The move from the "world of acts" to the "world of activities" thus
changes the question of fairness presented by the imposition of strict
liability on fairly distributed risks. In the "world of acts," strict
liability, as Fletcher says, merely substitutes "the risk of liability for
the risk of personal loss" 7 3 -it yields a different, but no fairer,
distribution of the financial burdens and benefits of accidental harm.
In the "world of acts," negligence is preferable to strict liability
because negligence reconciles liberty and security equally fairly, and
less expensively, than strict liability does. In the "world of activities,"
however, strict enterprise liability is fairer than negligence. Under
enterprise liability, those who benefit from the imposition of
particular systemic risks-from the risks of selling Coke in pressurized
bottles, or the risks of leaving water mains undisturbed until they
break-also bear the financial burdens of the accidents that issue from
these risks. In the "world of activities," unlike the "world of acts," the
extra burdens that strict liability places on the liberty of injurers are
less than the extra burdens than negligence places on the security of
72. The perception that the separate actors form a connected enterprise surfaces
very explicitly in Siegler, 502 P.2d at 1181.
73. Fletcher, supra note 4, at 547.
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victims. Negligence leaves concentrated harms on injurers; enterprise
liability disperses concentrated loss and distributes it across all the
beneficiaries of an enterprise.
In the "world of acts," it is reasonable to impose negligence liability
on reciprocal risks. Reasonable injurers may object that the move to
strict liability imposes as great a burden on their freedom of action as
negligence imposes on the security of victims. Under negligence, the
concentrated costs of nonnegligent accidents strike victims like
lightning; under strict liability those costs strike injurers like lightning.
Because strict liability yields a distribution of accident costs which is
no fairer than the distribution under negligence liability, it is
reasonable to maximize the size of the pie by preferring the cheaper
liability regime. In the "world of activities," by contrast, the burdens
are asymmetrical. By pinning an activity's accident costs on that
activity, enterprise liability distributes the costs of nonnegligent
accidents across those who benefit from the underlying risks.
Negligence liability leaves the costs of those accidents concentrated on
unlucky victims. Those victims have good reason to object: The
burden that strict enterprise liability places on injurers is both less
than the burden that negligence liability places on victims and more
fairly distributed. The burden of strict enterprise liability on injurers
is less than the burden of negligence liability on victims because
negligence liability leaves concentrated costs on victims, whereas strict
enterprise liability disperses those concentrated costs across the
enterprise responsible for them. The burdens of enterprise liability
are more fairly distributed because enterprise liability pins the costs of
nonnegligent accidents on those who benefit from the activity
responsible for them. Enterprise liability places the burden on those
who benefit.
2. The Facets of Fairness and the Relaxation of Causation
The fairness case for enterprise liability, however, is not fully
captured by the statement that it distributes the costs of accidents
across those who benefit from the underlying risks. Indeed, four
distinct facets of the fairness case for enterprise liability can be
distinguished. These four elements combine to relax the fairly stiff
requirement of causation characteristic of negligence liability in tort.
The moral logic of enterprise liability inside tort law is important for
two reasons. First, the exploration of that logic allows us to state the
case for the fairness of enterprise liability more fully. Second, the
exploration of that logic leads to the recognition that enterprise
liability may also flourish outside of tort law-in nonfault,
administrative accident plans-because it shows that enterprise
liability in tort deemphasizes one of the traditional elements of tort
liability.
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The first of the four facets of enterprise liability fairness is one that
we have already implicitly stressed-fairness to victims. It is unfair to
concentrate the costs of characteristic risk on those who simply
happen to suffer injury at the hands of such risk, when those costs
might be absorbed by those who impose the characteristic risk.
Fairness prescribes proportionality of burden and benefit. Victims
who are strangers to the enterprise derive no benefit from it, and it is
therefore unfair to ask them to bear a substantial loss when that loss
might be dispersed across those who participate in the enterprise and
therefore do benefit from it. Victims who are themselves participants
in an enterprise share in its benefits, but not in proportion to the
detriment they suffer when they are physically harmed by the
enterprise. Here, too, enterprise liability is fairer than negligence. It
disperses the costs of enterprise-related accidents and distributes them
within the enterprise, so that each member of the enterprise bears a
share.
Second, enterprise liability is fair to injurers because it simply asks
them to accept the costs of their choices. Those who create
characteristic risks do so for their own advantage, fully expecting to
reap the benefits that accrue from imposing those risks. If those who
impose characteristic risks choose wisely-if they put others at risk
only when they stand to gain more than those they put in peril stand
to lose-even under enterprise liability they will normally benefit
from the characteristic risks that they impose. If they do not, they
have only their poor judgment to blame, and society as a whole has
reason to penalize their choices. The Coast Guard lets its sailors loose
on shore leave for its own benefit (as well as for theirs) and it reaps
the rewards of their shore leave. If the costs of shore leave are greater
than the benefits, the Coast Guard has reason to reconsider the
practice, and society has reason to discourage it.
The conception of responsibility invoked in the last paragraph is a
familiar and widely accepted one. We take it for granted, for
example, that:
the person to whom the income of property or a business will accrue
if it does well has normally also to bear the risk of loss if it does
badly. In the law of sales, when the right to income or fruits
risk of deterioration or destruction
normally passes to the buyer, the
74
normally passes to him as well.

The same point might be made about the purchase of stocks, or even
lottery tickets. It is fair to ask agents who choose to act in pursuit of
their own interests and stand to profit if things go well to bear the risk
of loss when things go badly. Enterprise liability is fair to injurers.
Third, enterprise liability is fair because it exacts a just price from
injurers for the freedom that tort law confers upon them. Tort law
74. Tony Honord, Responsibility and Fault 79 (1999).
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permits potential injurers to put others at risk of physical injury
without their knowledge or consent, simply because potential injurers
believe that they stand to benefit from those risk impositions. Indeed,
tort law requires potential victims to entrust their lives and limbs to
persons and entities that stand to profit by imperiling them. This
power is of great value to potential injurers: They stand to reap
rewards by imposing risks in part because they can choose to impose
those risks in circumstances that maximize the benefit they gain from
doing so. The price that enterprise liability exacts for this freedom
and power is financial responsibility for physical harm, occasioned by
the exercise of that power. To induce potential injurers to exercise
their power over others responsibly-and to safeguard the security of
those others-enterprise liability taxes the exercise of the power to
put others at risk when it goes awry and issues in physical harm.
Negligence liability taxes the exercise of the power to imperil others
only when the injurer has exercised that power without sufficient
care.75 Accidental harms attributable to activities that are conducted
carefully but at an excessively high level of intensity, or without
undertaking justified research that would yield safer ways of
proceeding, tend to escape the reach of negligence liability. Strict
accountability induces potential injurers-particularly
large
enterprises-to conduct their activities more carefully. By taxing
every exercise of the power to imperil others that issues in an accident
characteristic of the enterprise in question, enterprise liability induces
injurers to comb through their activities in search of risk reducing
precautions. Worthwhile precautions whose omission escapes the eye
of negligence law may be induced by the imposition of enterprise
liability.
Put differently, the freedom to imperil others when and as one sees
fit is enormously valuable. Strict accountability for the harm that one
does is a fair price to pay for that freedom, especially when paying
that price helps to ensure that the power to imperil others is exercised
with due regard for their safety. How do we know, though, that an
appropriate level of safety-not an excessive one-is induced?
Economists appeal to the idea of an optimal level of safety to answer
such questions, but that idea is unavailable within a fairness
framework.7 6 The answer it gives has both normative and empirical
75. The ideas in this paragraph draw on the writings of Steve Shavell, Guido
Calabresi, and Jon Hirschoff. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 40; Shavell,
Economic Analysis, supra note 39; Shavell, Strict Liability,supra note 39.
76. Much of the economic literature on the effects of enterprise liability is
enormously relevant, however. It matters a great deal, for example, whether or not
the expansion of liability under the influence of enterprise liability ideas triggered the
insurance crisis of the late 1980s. The debate between scholars such as Richard
Epstein and George Priest on the one hand, see Richard A. Epstein, Products
Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. Legal Stud. 645 (1985); George L. Priest, The
Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1521 (1987) [hereinafter
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dimensions.

Normatively, we have good reason to regard risks of

severe, irreparable injury as especially worth avoiding. Accidental
physical injury that brings life to a premature close or irreversibly
alters its normal course justifies especially stringent precaution. There
is good reason to think that strict accountability induces potential
injurers to conduct their activities more safely than fault liability does,
and little reason to think that it induces too much safety.
There is good reason to believe that strict accountability induces

potential injurers to conduct their activities more safely than
negligence liability does precisely because strict accountability induces
potential injurers to regulate the intensity as well as the carefulness

with which they conduct their activities, and prompts potential
injurers to comb through their practices in pursuit of superior
precautions. There is little reason to think that strict accountability
induces too much precaution because tort damages do not even
attempt to exact a price for all of the harm that accidents wreakemotional, relational, and economic, as well as physical.77 Indeed, the

most

grievous

harm

that

accidents

inflict

generally

goes

uncompensated, because it is beyond compensation. Tort law does
not generally award wrongful death damages for the value of the life

that the victim lost.78

The price that strict tort liability exacts

therefore seems unlikely, absent special circumstances, to induce
excessive precaution. This seems all the more true when we take into

account the fact that only a small fraction of valid accident claims are
ever pursued.7 9

Priest, Insurance Crisis]; George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 Val.
U. L. Rev. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Priest, Modern Tort Law], and scholars such as Jon
Hanson, Kyle Logue, and Steven Croley on the other hand, is enormously relevant
here, see Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative
Explanationfor Recent Events in ProductsLiability, 8 Yale J. on Reg. 1 (1991); Jon D.
Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic
Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 129 (1990). If enterprise
liability precipitates uninsurability in some range of cases, and if the problem cannot
be corrected by various revisions to enterprise liability schemes (e.g., reformulating
damages to make them lower and more manageable), then the argument that
enterprise liability distributes the benefits and burdens of accidental injury more fairly
than negligence simply fails. See infra Part IV.B.
77. See Tort and Accident Law, supra note 1, at 657-76 (discussing recovery for
pure emotional and pure economic harm); id. at 700-21 (discussing damages for
relational harm); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 54,
at 359-67 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts]
(discussing recovery for "mental disturbance"); id. § 125, at 931-36 (discussing
recovery for relational harm).
78. See Tort and Accident Law, supra note 1, at 700-13 (discussing compensation
for harm stemming from wrongful deaths); Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts,
supra note 77, § 127, at 949-54 (discussing damages for wrongful death claims).
79. See Deborah R. Hensler et al., Compensation for Accidental Injuries:
Research Design and Methods 110 (1991) ("[O]verall, about one injury in ten leads to
an attempt to collect liability compensation.").
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The fourth facet of fairness returns us to the general idea of burdenbenefit proportionality: Enterprise liability distributes accident costs
among actual and potential injurers more fairly than negligence does.
Negligence liability does not require that the costs of accidents-even
negligent accidents-be spread among those who create similar risks
of harm, whereas enterprise liability does. Enterprise liability asserts:
(1) that accident costs should be internalized by the enterprise whose
costs they are; and (2) that those costs should be dispersed and
distributed among those who constitute the enterprise, and who
therefore benefit from its risk impositions. Negligence liability, by
contrast, holds that injurers have a duty to make reparation when they
injure others through their own carelessness. Negligence liability
justifies shifting concentrated losses, whereas enterprise liability
justifies dispersing and distributing concentrated losses. To be sure,
nothing in negligence liability forbids injurers from insuring against
potential liability, but nothing in negligence liability requires it, either.
Insurance is not integral to negligence liability, even though insuring
against negligence liability is standard modern practice.
It is, moreover, important in this regard that insuring against
negligence liability makes negligence liability fairer precisely because
it moves negligence towards enterprise liability. Negligence liability is
often harsh, and problematically so.80 In part, negligence law is harsh
because it justifies shifting potentially devastating losses from injurers
to victims on the basis of relatively modest acts of wrongdoing. A
moment's carelessness behind the wheel of a car can inflict millions of
dollars of harm, and that is enough to bankrupt most drivers. The
price that negligence liability exacts can thus seem quite
disproportionate to the wrongfulness of the conduct whose
blameworthiness justifies the exaction. The ordinary negligence of
natural persons is a relatively innocent sort of wrongdoing: The
failure to foresee a risk clearly enough, calculate its probability
accurately enough, concentrate well enough, or execute a course of
action precisely enough, are all instances of ordinary negligence. We
are all prone to such mistakes, human frailty being what it is. Yet
negligence law is unforgiving. Failures to act as a reasonable person
would act in similar circumstances are enough to support liability,
even if those failures are the product of ordinary imperfection. And
the extent of the ensuing liability can be devastating.
So long as we restrict our gaze to the apportionment of costs
between a particular injurer and the victim of her negligence,
80. "Average reasonable person" doctrine shows this side of negligence liability
most clearly. See Tort and Accident Law, supra note 1, at 345-68; Prosser & Keeton
on the Law of Torts, supra note 77, § 32, at 177 (noting that even people with severe
mental disabilities are held to the standard of "a normal, prudent person").
Comparative negligence tends to mitigate some of this harshness, because it takes the
particularities of the parties into account in apportioning fault.
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negligence law is exacting and intolerant, but justifiably and fairly so.
The activities that negligence liability regulates are unforgiving. Small
mistakes can explode into serious injuries. Momentary lapses of
attention behind the wheel of a car-or at the helm of a ship or the
controls of a plane-can and do destroy human lives. The seriousness
of the harm risked by ordinary negligence is good reason to hold
actors to strict standards of conduct. And the failure to conform to a
norm of reasonable care is a kind of wrongdoing, even if not a
particularly egregious one. Wrongdoing fairly exposes wrongdoers to
responsibility to repair the harm that they have done. Forgiving
wrongful lapses in concentration and failures of foresight would
allocate the losses these frailties cause even more unfairly. Why
should injured victims absorb the costs of the carelessness that
harmed them? Shifting the costs of a negligent injury to the
wrongdoer whose inadvertence caused it may be harsh, but it is fairer
than letting the loss lie where it fell. Finally, forgiving lapses in
concentration and failures of foresight might well encourage
carelessness. Forbearance tends to foster the objects of its indulgence.
Holding actors accountable for the harmful consequences of their
understandable errors is, then, fairer than excusing them. But this
does not settle all questions of fairness, nor undermine the argument
that enterprise liability is fairer still. The small lapses that very
occasionally precipitate large injuries are common indeed. Most of us
occasionally let our minds wander while behind the wheel of our cars,
give some small risk insufficient consideration, or fail to execute some
all too familiar precaution with the precision that it requires. Most of
us also usually escape without injuring anyone else. Yet the luck of
the draw is all that distinguishes those of us who get away without
injuring anyone from those of us who inflict grievous injury. Fate
singles out an unlucky few for liability-often massive liability-and
fortune spares the rest.
Those unlucky few who inflict injury cannot, on balance, claim that
they are unjustly held accountable for the harm that their wrongdoing
has caused, but they might justly complain that a system under which
they alone bear the costs of the injuries they inflict is less fair than one
which pools those losses among all those who create similar negligent
risks.81 Negligence mitigated by the institution of liability insurance is
fairer than negligence detached from that institution.
Liability
insurance distributes the costs of negligence among all those who are,
over the long run, similarly negligent, and that is fairer than leaving
the costs of negligence on those whose misfortune it is to have their
negligence issue in injury.
Luck and luck alone separates the
negligent who cause injury from the negligent who do not. It is fairer
81. Jeremy Waldron makes this point forcefully in Moments of Carelessness and
Massive Loss, in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 387 (David G. Owen ed.,
1995).
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to neutralize the arbitrary effects of luck than to let luck wreak havoc
with people's lives.
Just as negligence liability with the institution of liability insurance
is fairer among actual and potential victims than is negligence liability
without that institution, so too enterprise liability is fairer than
negligence liability with insurance. Once negligence liability operates
against the background of liability insurance, all that divides it from
enterprise liability is its treatment of those accident costs that flow
from reasonable risk impositions. Both negligence liability and
enterprise liability pool the accident costs that issue from negligent
risk impositions among those who are similarly negligent. Negligence
liability, however, leaves the nonnegligent accident costs of an activity
on the activity's victims, whereas enterprise liability distributes those
costs across the enterprise-across all those who impose the
characteristic risks that lead to such accidents. Under negligence
liability, victims may disperse the costs of an activity's nonnegligent
accidents by purchasing loss insurance, but victim loss insurance will
not generally distribute those costs across those who impose similar
risks. Loss insurance will disperse accident costs across an actuarially
similar pool of insureds, and the premium will be paid out of the
insured's pocket. Absent special circumstances,82 it will be a matter of
mere coincidence if the pool of actuarially similar insureds somehow
benefits from the activity responsible for the harm. Demanding that
victims insure themselves against accidental losses inflicted upon them
by the activities of others and so shoulder the burden of realizing the
socially desirable end of loss-dispersion adds "institutional insult to
personal injury."83
When reasonable risk results in accidental harm, chance and chance
alone separates those who injure and are injured from those who do
not and are not. To leave nonnegligent losses on those whose
misfortune it is to suffer them, when we might readily spread these
losses among all those who create similar risks of injury, is unfair.
When the concentrated costs of nonnegligent accidents might easily
be dispersed and distributed across those who benefit from the
creation of the relevant risks, the victims of such accidents might
reasonably object to a principle of responsibility that leaves the costs
of those nonnegligent accidents concentrated on victims. Those who
benefit from the imposition of the relevant risks but escape injury at
the hand of those risks, by contrast, cannot reasonably object to
having nonnegligent accident costs dispersed and distributed across all
those who benefit from the imposition of the relevant risks. It may be
rational to seek to appropriate the benefits of recurring risk
82. The principal special circumstance is the use of compulsory loss insurance to
effect enterprise liability under no-fault automobile insurance. See infra Part III.B.1.
83. The felicitous expression is Jules Coleman's. Jules L. Coleman, Adding
InstitutionalInsult to PersonalInjury, 8 Yale J. on Reg. 223, 230 (1991).
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imposition for oneself and to thrust the burdens of those risk
impositions onto others, but it is not reasonable to do so.
Dispersing the nonnegligent accident costs characteristic of an
activity across pools of victims who are bound together only by their
actuarial similarity is likewise less reasonable than dispersing them
across the injurers who create similar risks and benefit from doing so.
People who do not benefit from an activity may reasonably object to
bearing its costs when those who do benefit might be made to bear its
costs with equal ease. In short: Fairness favors dispersing the costs of
blameless accidents among all those who create similar risks of such
accidents, just as much as it favors dispersing the costs of accidents
precipitated by wrongdoing among lucky and unlucky wrongdoers.
Pooling the risks of negligent accidents, but not the risks of
nonnegligent accidents, is presumptively less fair than pooling both
sets of risks.
This last argument of fairness highlights both the fact that
enterprise liability relaxes the requirement of causation, and also the
fact that the logic of fairness at work in enterprise liability criticizesas arbitrary and unfair-the traditional tort insistence on a fairly rigid
sort of causation. When cause and cause alone distinguishes those
who injure from those who do not, luck and luck alone distinguishes
those who bear liability from those who escape it. Insisting on actual
causation of harm as a necessary condition of liability when luck and
luck alone determines who causes harm is arbitrary and unjustifiable.
There is no good reason why a person unfortunate enough to have her
carelessness issue in massive injury should bear massive loss, while
many others who have been identically culpable are spared all
responsibility.'
Within the law of torts, the basic thrust of enterprise liability is to
press for the expansion of liability within traditional domains of strict
liability, and to expand the domain of strict liability relative to
negligence. Just how far it does and should press in this direction are
deeply contested matters in torts scholarship. But the matter cannot
be said to be understudied.85 The same cannot be said, however, for
84. With small numbers, this is the lesson of Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal.
1948).
85. From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, there was a vigorous debate among
economically inclined tort scholars over the merits of enterprise liability. For
criticism of enterprise liability, see Epstein, supra note 76, at 648-53 (arguing that
modern products liability law frustrates the tripartite insurance ideals of diversifying
risk, ameliorating adverse selection, and limiting moral hazard); Priest, Insurance
Crisis, supra note 76, at 1553 (arguing that first-party insurance is preferable to thirdparty insurance through tort liability because the former can incorporate copayments,
whereas the latter cannot); Priest, Modern Tort Law, supra note 76, at 17 (arguing
that product manufacturers are in a poor position to acquire adequate information
about the riskiness of insureds and cannot charge higher product prices to higher risk
purchasers and users); Alan Schwartz, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60 Fordham
L. Rev. 819, 820, 832-40 (1992) (arguing that product defects should be subject to a
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the way in which enterprise liability and its aspiration to distribute the
costs of accidents fairly make themselves felt beyond the law of torts.
It is to that subject, therefore, that we shall now turn.
B. EnterpriseLiability Beyond Tort

If considerations of fairness favor enterprise liability within tort,
they also favor enterprise liability beyond tort. Administrative
alternatives to the law of torts-workers' compensation schemes, nofault automobile insurance, statutory schemes for the compensation of
certain kinds of injuries (e.g., ones inflicted by vaccination)-are often
thought to express loss-spreading or insurance ideas which have little

or nothing in common with the law of torts.8 6 The claim that these
schemes embody the idea that it is better to spread a loss across many
people than to leave it concentrated on one person seems correct. But
it is unpersuasive to claim that these schemes embody loss-spreading
aims to the exclusion of fairness concerns. The idea of fairness that

enterprise liability expresses is evident in the law of torts, but it also is
evident beyond that law, in administrative schemes that displace the
"market" regime of "free contract" with compulsory disclosure, because strict liability
forces consumers to purchase excessive amounts of insurance and inefficiently
depresses demand by forcing manufacturers to insure for nonpecuniary harm).
The vigorous criticism voiced by Epstein, Priest, Schwartz, and others
prompted an equally vigorous defense of enterprise liability by a younger generation
of scholars. These scholars argued that third-party insurance is generally more
efficient than first-party insurance, especially in the case of product-related accidents,
and especially at sorting insureds into suitably narrow risk pools. See Croley &
Hanson, supra note 76, at 109-10 (arguing that enterprise liability is stimulating the
rise of mutual insurance companies, which are constructing more homogeneous and
thus more efficient risk pools); Hanson & Logue, supra note 76, at 137 (arguing that
first-party insurers fail to adjust premiums according to consumption choices and that
a negligence regime therefore induces manufacturers to make suboptimal investments
in product safety, whereas enterprise liability optimizes manufacture care and activity
levels). Croley and Hanson have also challenged the argument that the award of
nonpecuniary damages is inefficient. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The
Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108
Harv. L. Rev. 1787, 1791-93 (1995) (arguing that proposals to reform the tort system
by reducing compensation are not efficient from a deterrence perspective and that
tort law may show the existence of otherwise unmet consumer demand for insurance
against pain and suffering).
86. Corrective justice theorists in particular often see these schemes as expressing
only an insurance ideal that losses should be distributed, and widely so. They see this
ideal as entirely different from the conception of responsibility that they find in tort
law. An essential element of this claims that these schemes do not embody corrective
justice conceptions of responsibility because they drastically de-emphasize causation
of harm as a condition of liability. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 10, at 395-406;
Weinrib, supra note 10, at 38-42. If the argument of this section is correct, corrective
justice theorists are wrong to believe that insurance justifications alone are capable of
justifying these schemes. But they are right to believe that the attenuation of
causation is characteristic of these schemes and, indeed, of enterprise liability itself.
The logic of fairness supports this attenuation. In criticizing the attenuation of
causation, collective justice theorists thus highlight a fundamental difference between
the idea of fairness and the idea of corrective justice.

2004]

THE LAW OFACCIDENTS

1899

law of torts proper. Indeed, the idea of enterprise liability found its
first full expression not in the law of torts, but in one of these
schemes-namely, workers' compensation law.87
Administrative versions of enterprise liability warrant our attention
for three reasons. First, their continuity with the law of torts is worth
establishing, in light of contemporary claims of radical discontinuity.
Second, administrative schemes are important because they are
capable of instituting the idea of fairness that animates enterprise
liability in circumstances where tort law cannot. Third, administrative
schemes shed light on the idea of fairness that animates enterprise
liability.
Nonfault administrative schemes both accentuate the
attenuation of causation-the de-emphasis of the causal connection
between injurer and victim-that characterizes enterprise liability as a
whole, and highlight the elasticity of the idea of "enterprise" itself.
1. Advantages of Administrative Alternatives
The most familiar administrative alternatives to tort are workers'
compensation schemes and no-fault automobile insurance. The latter
is a particularly illuminating case in point. First, the very idea that nofault automobile insurance institutes a form of enterprise liability may
come as a surprise. Enterprise liability in tort is a form of strict injurer
liability, associated with liability insurance. No-fault automobile
insurance, by contrast, is a form of loss insurance which displaces
negligence liability in tort. And loss insurance itself is usually thought
of as an alternative to tort liability. Even within the tort law of
accidents, the availability of loss insurance has long been conceived as
a reason to bound tort liability.8" Loss insurance disperses the costs of
a loss that would otherwise be concentrated on its victim. That,
indeed, is its very point. In tort cases, loss insurance is less likely than
liability insurance to disperse injury costs across those who benefit
from the creation of the relevant risk. When victims and injurers are
strangers to one another, strict liability coupled with liability

87. See, e.g., Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 Harv.
L. Rev. 235, 344 (1914); Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 Colum. L. Rev. 444,
456 (1923) (addressing the idea that accident costs should be distributed among those
who benefit from the enterprise that creates them as a distinctive conception of strict
liability, and tracing that idea to the Workmen's Compensation Acts adopted around
the turn of the twentieth century).
I discuss the contribution of workers'
compensation schemes to enterprise liability in tort in Gregory C. Keating, The
Theory of EnterpriseLiability and Common Law Strict Liability, supra note 61.
88. See, e.g., Ryan v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 209, 216 (1866) (holding that
negligence liability for starting a fire should not extend beyond the house immediately
set afire by the defendant's negligence, in part because "each man" is "enabled to
obtain a reasonable security" by insuring against loss). In the same vein, modern
critics of enterprise liability in tort have often favored (victim) loss insurance as an
alternative to (injurer) enterprise liability. See Epstein, supra note 76; Priest,
Insurance Crisis,supra note 76; Priest, Modern Tort Law, supra note 76.
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insurance will tend to disperse the costs of characteristic risks across
those who benefit from their creation because efficient risk-pooling
requires pooling injurers who impose similar risks of injury. This
tends to disperse the costs of any given type of nonnegligent accident
across those who create similar risks of such accidents. Loss insurance
does not have an equally strong tendency to disperse losses across
those who benefit from the risks that cause those losses because
efficient loss insurance only requires dispersing accident costs across
some pool of actuarially similar victims. It pools victims who suffer
similar injuries, not injurers who impose similar risks.
When injurers and victims are members of the same closed
community of risk, however, loss insurance can distribute the costs of
that community's characteristic risks as fairly as liability insurance
does. (Among other things, no-fault automobile insurance shows that
reciprocity theorists are right to point to the practice of driving as a
canonical instance of a "community of risk.") Under compulsory loss
insurance, each member of such a community of risk bears his or her
fair share of its characteristic accident costs in the form of a loss
insurance premium. Under liability insurance, they bear it in the form
of a liability insurance premium. When potential victims are also and
equally potential injurers, loss insurance internalizes accident costs as
much as strict injurer liability does. No-fault automobile insurance
exploits this fact, using mandatory loss insurance to create a kind of
enterprise liability.
Within a community of risk, then, it may be possible to use either
compulsory loss insurance or strict liability to institute enterprise
liability and thereby distribute the costs of characteristic risk fairlyacross those who benefit from its creation. When compulsory loss
insurance or strict liability can both distribute accident costs fairly, the
choice between them turns on considerations of administrability, cost,
and risk reduction. In the automobile accident context, for instance,
no-fault insurance appears cheaper and easier to administer.
Cheaper, because it does not require transferring the costs of
nonnegligent accidents from victims to injurers. Easier to administer,
because in the absence of fault it is hard to attribute automobile
related accidents to one party as the "injurer." This attribution
problem is, in fact, so acute that strict liability in its usual formholding injurers liable for all the physical harms that issue from the
characteristic risks of their activity-is not a live alternative to
negligence. 9 By contrast, it is easy to identify an injury suffered in the
course of an automobile accident, and thus easy to implement no-fault
automobile insurance.
89. Recall Baron Bramwell: "Where two carriages come in collision, if there is no
negligence in either it is as much the act of the one driver as of the other that they
meet." Fletcher v. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737, 744 (Ex. 1865) (Bramwell, J.,
dissenting), affd 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868) (appeal taken from Ex.).
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No-fault automobile insurance illustrates two general advantages
that nontort administrative schemes have over enterprise liability in
tort. First, such schemes are often able to solve attribution problems
that common law incarnations of enterprise liability cannot. Causal
problems-the inability to distinguish injurer from victim in the
absence of some fault criterion-prevent the law of torts from
imposing strict liability in tort on highway accidents. 9 No-fault
insurance circumvents this problem. By requiring victims to insure
against nonnegligent losses (as well as negligent ones), no-fault
insurance is capable of attributing the nonnegligent accident costs of
driving to the activity. Compulsory loss insurance attributes the costs
of automobile accidents to the activity of driving without requiring us
to sort injurers from victims in cases of nonnegligent injury. Tort law
is unable to tap the mechanism of compulsory first-party insurance
against loss in a similar way.
Other administrative schemes solve attribution problems which
would bedevil, if not defeat, the common law of torts, by specifying in
detail which injuries are to be attributed to a particular activity. The
National Childhood Vaccination Act, for example, incorporates a
"Vaccine Injury Table," listing illnesses associated with various
vaccines and time periods following the administration of a
vaccination within which the first symptom or manifestation of an
illness may occur. Proof that an illness occurred within a specific time
period creates a rebuttable presumption that the vaccination was its
cause. Aggregate statistical connections between exposure and illness
establish causation.
The second advantage of administrative schemes is that they often
can effect enterprise liability in circumstances where the common law
cannot, because administrative schemes can exert more control over
the mechanisms and institutions of insurance. Enterprise liability in
tort must, for the most part, hope that the imposition of strict liability
will stimulate the provision of appropriate self or third-party
insurance against liability. Administrative schemes, by contrast, can
compel the purchase of insurance. 91 Compelling insurance against
some class of accidents both stimulates the demand for insurance and
facilitates its provision. Other things equal, the larger the pool of
insureds, the easier it is to spread risk among them. 9 Administrative
90. See infra Part IV.A.
91. Compelled insurance is a universal feature of workers' compensation schemes,
for example. See 3 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation
Law § 150.01 (2003) ("All states require that compensation liability be secured."
(citation omitted)).
92. See Robert I. Mehr et al., Principles of Insurance 35 (8th ed. 1985) (listing "a
large group of homogeneous exposure units" as the first of seven criteria that "need
to be considered before attempting to operate a successful insurance plan"). Note
that a pool of insureds that is larger but less homogenous is not necessarily easier to
insure. It depends on whether size dominates homogeneity in the context at hand.
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schemes can also compel the use of particular insurance mechanisms,
as no-fault automobile liability schemes compel the use of first-party
insurance against loss. Indeed, administrative schemes can foster the
provision of insurance even more directly.
Legislatures and
administrative agencies can construct appropriate insurance
mechanisms, and require the provision of insurance to parties who are
either unable to self-insure or unable to purchase private insurance in
the marketplace. State-sponsored insurance funds are a familiar part
of workers' compensation law, for example, as is the practice of
providing for assignment of rejected risks.93
Nontort administrative schemes raise a host of questions. Some of
these raise important issues about the logic of fair distribution of
accident costs. What, for example, are we to make of the reduced
damages typically found in such schemes? 94 Is it fair to trade size of
recovery for certainty of recovery? Is it more fair to key damages
solely to the kind or severity of injury, as workers' compensation
schemes typically do? Or is it more fair to peg them at the level
necessary to restore the particular victim to the level of well-being
that she enjoyed prior to her injury, as tort liability generally does?
Other questions raise important issues about the role of enterprise
liability in reducing risk to a reasonable level. What effect does
reducing damages, but making their payment more certain, have on
the level of risk-reduction? 95 What effect does instituting enterprise
liability by victim insurance-instead of by injurer strict liabilityhave on the level of risk associated with an activity?
These are important questions.
Making the case for an
administrative alternative to negligence liability in tort-for no-fault
automobile insurance instead of negligence liability, say-requires
addressing these questions. It is not enough to make the case that the
administrative scheme distributes accident costs more fairly. The
greater fairness of an administrative scheme-when it exists-has only
prima facie force. If no-fault automobile insurance, for example, were
to distribute accident costs more fairly than negligence but precipitate
more fatal automobile accidents, 96 it seems likely that its failure as a
93. See Larson & Larson, supra note 91, § 150.01 ("Six states require insurance in
an exclusive state fund. Fourteen states have competitive state funds." (citations
omitted)); see also id. § 150.05 (discussing Assigned Risk Practice). In a similar vein,
the National Childhood Vaccination Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to 300aa-34 (2000),
creates a trust fund to pay compensation to those eligible to recover under the Act.
94. See Tort and Accident Law, supra note 1, at 1159-64, 1203-06.
95. For a recent attempt to investigate an aspect of this problem, see Yu-Ping
Liao & Michelle J. White, No-fault for Motor Vehicles: An Economic Analysis, 4 Am.
L. & Econ. Rev. 258 (2002).
96. See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does
Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 377,393-97 (1994) (surveying the literature
addressing whether no-fault automobile insurance increases the incidence and/or the
severity of automobile accidents).
Schwartz discusses the effect of no-fault's
guarantee of compensation to drivers injured through their own negligence on the
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system of reasonable risk reduction would trump its advantages as a
system for the fair distribution of accident costs. But these questions,
important as they are, are beyond the scope of our present concerns
with the fundamental connections between the idea of fairness and
forms of liability.
One feature of nontort administrative schemes which we have yet
to discuss does, however, go to the fundamental question that
concerns us.
Administrative schemes sometimes reach beyond
enterprise liability to industry-wide liability and even society-wide
liability. In doing so, do they take the logic of fairness a step further,
or do they expand the notion of "enterprise" so far that it breaks,
leaving us with a different kind of liability? Do industry- and societywide nonfault administrative schemes express in whole or in part the
ideal of fairness which animates enterprise liability, or do they simply
express the ideal of insurance-the idea that losses should be
dispersed? For anyone concerned with the inner logic and the limits
of enterprise liability, this is an important question. To answer it,
even tentatively, however, we need to specify the distinctive features
of these forms of liability.
2. Industry- and Society-Wide Liability
Industry-wide liability charges accident costs arising from the type
of activity conducted by a particular industry to the industry as a
whole. An industry-wide fund is established, financed by a flat
assessment levied on all of the firms that are members of the industry.
Someone injured by the pertinent type of activity recovers from the
industry-wide fund-not from the particular firm that injured her-on
a nonfault basis. The National Childhood Vaccination Act imposes
industry-wide liability, as does the federal scheme for compensating
the victims of black lung disease.97 Tort law itself reaches beyond
enterprise liability toward industry-wide liability in the special case of
9 8 for
market share liability. Under Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,
example, victims whose injuries are caused by generic products may
sue every producer of the generic product that injured them, and may
recover from each firm in proportion to that firm's share of the
product market. Under this form of market share liability, all the
firms that manufacture a particular product share collective
responsibility for the product's accident costs, and each firm pays its
proportionate share of those costs.

frequency and severity of accidents. Id. at 396.
97. Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No.
91-173, 83 Stat. 742, 792-98, amended by The Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 30
U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (2000).
98. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
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Society-wide liability compensates victims out of general tax
revenues: The whole society is the source of reparation. The New
Zealand Accident Compensation Scheme is the most famous example,
but administrative schemes such as the Price-Anderson Act99-which
governs the liability of licensed private operators of nuclear power
plants for nuclear accidents-also embodies the idea of societal
responsibility. Under society-wide liability, reparation is made not by
the firm and its insurer (as under enterprise liability), or by the
industry as a whole (as under industry liability), but by society as a
whole.
For our purposes, the fundamental question here is whether
industry- and society-wide liability are simply expressions of the idea
of social insurance, or if they also embody the enterprise liability idea
of fairness. Social insurance embodies the idea of loss-spreading writ
large-the idea that it is better to disperse the costs of significant
injuries as widely as possible, rather than leave them concentrated on
victims. Nothing in the idea of social insurance requires dispersing
costs across those who benefit from their creation. Enterprise liability
links loss-spreading to fairness: Accident costs should be internalized
by-and distributed across-the enterprises that generate them so
that burdens and benefits are fairly proportioned.
In important part, industry- and society-wide liability embody the
same idea of fairness as enterprise liability. Market share liability
holds individual firms responsible for that portion of a product's
accident costs that corresponds to the firm's share of the product
market. By so doing, it apportions financial responsibility in
accordance not just with the harm caused by the firm, but in
accordance with the benefit that the firm derived from the sale of the
product, on one plausible measure of benefit. Market share liability
thus institutes the principle of burden-benefit proportionality within
an entire product market-or industry. When industry-wide liability
is instituted by administrative scheme, it has essentially the same
effect, though the extent to which burden-benefit proportionality is
realized depends in part on the way the assessment is levied within the
industry. Payments in proportion to risk imposed realize burdenbenefit proportionality more fully than a flat assessment on each firm.
Enterprise liability radiates out even further in the Price-Anderson
Act, which limits the liability of nuclear power plants licensed by the
federal government for nuclear accidents resulting from the operation
of those plants, and further still in the New Zealand Accident Scheme.
Considerations of fairness figure prominently in the justification of
both schemes.
The Price-Anderson Act illustrates both the
establishment of industry-wide liability by administrative act, and the
99. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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movement beyond industry liability to society-wide liability. At the
time that its constitutionality was litigated in Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group,"° the Price-Anderson Act
included an industry-wide fund, albeit one that may not have been
large enough to cover the full cost of a major nuclear accident. The
district court opinion in the case explained the link between such a
fund-between industry-wide liability-and the principle of burdenbenefit proportionality:
[A] liability pool... requiring either contributions in advance, or
liability for assessment on a unit basis or otherwise, of all power
companies building or operating nuclear generators.., would
effectively place the responsibility upon the group most directly
profiting from any improvement in the costs or usefulness of electric
power-the power company stockholders and the customers
themselves. 0 1
Can the idea of benefit-burden proportionality be linked to societywide liability? The court thought so:
Another rational alternative [to industry-wide liability] would be to
make such accidents a national loss and to pay those damaged out of
the federal treasury. This would spread the loss among those who
benefited indirectly by having the nation's power supply 0increased
2
as well as among those who presumably benefited directly.'
The force of this point-the fairness of society-wide liability-can
be seen by considering the rationale of the Supreme Court decision
upholding the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act, even
though its ceiling on total recovery would leave some victims of a
major nuclear accident unable to recover from the fund created by the
Act. Liability limitation, the Court said, "is an acceptable method for
Congress to utilize in encouraging the private development of electric
energy by atomic power" when Congress reasonably concludes0 3that
If
the development of such power plants is in the public interest.
public benefit is the rationale for encouraging the private provision of
nuclear power, it is fairer for society as a whole to share the costs of a
nuclear accident, than it is to leave the loss on those unlucky enough
to be harmed by such an accident. Benefit-burden proportionalityfairness-favors placing an important share of the liability on the
public.
The widest scheme of society-wide liability is the New Zealand
Accident scheme, which covers all cases of "personal injury by
accident."
This scheme expresses a "principle of community
100. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
101. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 431 F.
Supp. 203,225 (W.D. N.C. 1977).

102. Id.
103. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 86.

1906

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

responsibility." That principle involves a capacious interpretation of
the idea of fairness as proportional sharing of burden and benefit:
[Slince we all persist in following community activities, which year
by year exact a predictable and inevitable price in bodily injury, so
should we all share in sustaining those who become the random but
statistically necessary victims. The inherent cost of these community
4
purposes should be borne on a basis of equity by the community.'0
The first lesson here is that the ideal of fairness may animate
industry- and society-wide liability as much or more than the ideal of
loss-spreading. The contemporary inclination to see all invocation of
insurance considerations in tort law simply as an expression of the
idea that losses should be dispersed, not concentrated,1"5 can blind us
to the role being played by considerations of fairness. The idea of
fairness that informs enterprise liability makes its presence felt even in
the most expansive administrative schemes of accident law; even in
schemes which appear, at first blush, to be pure expressions of
insurance ideas. A second lesson has more to tell us about the idea of
fairness itself. Identifying the relevant community of benefit and
burden-the relevant enterprise-is a standing challenge for any form
of enterprise liability. A common, and well-taken, criticism of
burden-benefit proportionality has it roots in the difficulty of
identifying the relevant enterprise. That criticism complains that the
idea of burden-benefit proportionality is analytically obscure or
10 6
incomplete: How can we tell who benefits and in what proportion?
Appeal to the economic notions of marginal and infra-marginal
benefit is out of place here; we are discussing fairness, not efficiency.
The variety of forms of enterprise liability extant in our law provide
an answer to this question. That answer reveals an analytic idea, but it
also displays the role of controversial, contestable, and essentially
political judgment.
Why do these schemes claim that the
characteristic accident costs of an activity may be fairly distributed by
industry- and society-wide liability as well as by enterprise liability in
tort? The analytic basis of their claim is that the benefits of risky
activities radiate outward in concentric circles. Nuclear power most
benefits those who produce and consume it, but it also benefits those
of us who merely happen to live in a society made wealthier by its
presence. This is not a peculiarity of nuclear power. The immediate
104. Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, Compensation for Personal
Injury in New Zealand para. 56, at 40 (1967).
105. Dispositions in both economically oriented and corrective justice approaches
to tort combine to support this tendency. Economically inclined scholarship supposes
that accident law should pursue the twin ends of efficient accident avoidance and
efficient insurance against accidental injuries whose prevention is inefficient.
Corrective justice theories have been disposed to accept economic characterizations
of the case for enterprise liability. See supra note 10.
106. I am grateful to Ken Abraham for urging on me the importance of this
criticism.
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benefits of transporting gasoline by tanker trucks accrue to those in
the industry; less immediate but still substantial benefits accrue to
those who use gasoline regularly; and still smaller benefits accrue to
those who rarely or never drive themselves, but who benefit from the
productive activity that driving enables. The benefits of activities
radiate outward until they diminish to the point where they are no
longer identifiable. The determination of who benefits--of what the
relevant community of benefit is or ought to be for purposes of
apportioning the costs of accidents-is an essentially contestable
matter. Deciding whether we should, "all things considered," move to
a regime of accident law with more industry-wide liability, more
administrative plans, or even abolish tort law entirely and replace it
with a New Zealand style scheme of society-wide liability is a vast
undertaking, well beyond the scope of this Article. For our purposes,
the main lesson lies in the fact that enterprise liability can be given
such widely varying construction, so that fixing the proper scope of
enterprise liability requires the exercise of normative and political
judgment. Judgments about communities of benefit are eminently
political judgments about how we should order our lives in commonand properly so.107
Because risky activities radiate their benefits out across a variety of
actors, and because the boundaries of communities of risk may be
fixed in narrower and broader ways, the idea of fairness can give rise
to industry- and society-wide liability as well as to enterprise liability
in tort. Whether the idea of fairness that animates enterprise liability
in tort is best embodied-either in general or in a particular
instance-by enterprise liability in tort, or by an administrative
incarnation of enterprise liability, or by an administrative scheme of
industry- or society-wide liability, is a matter that can only be settled
by detailed examination of the possibilities at hand.
Deciding whether enterprise liability should be instituted at the
level of individual firms (as common law enterprise liability usually
does), or at the level of a particular risky practice such as driving, or at
an industry- or society-wide level, requires both an appraisal of the
institutional mechanisms available and the reasons favoring broader
and narrower specifications of the relevant community. The exercise
of contestable, normative, and political judgment is cause for concern
only insofar as it raises the worry that the idea of benefit-burden
proportionality is empty or especially obscure.
107. See Honor6, supra note 74, at 91.
One can argue that the distribution of risks should, for example as regards
motoring, take place at the level not of the individual but of the vehicleowning population or the whole community. The level at which risks should
be distributed in a particular area of community life seems pre-eminently a
matter of political judgment.

1908

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

The worry is unfounded. Questions about how to interpret burden
and benefit arise in particular contexts. Those contexts provide
structure and definition, so that the determination of the relevant
community of benefit and burden becomes a classic interpretive
question of the sort lawyers routinely confront. 10 8 Legislators
constructing enterprise liability schemes begin with a pre-theoretic
sense of the domain of burden and benefit-be it customers,
employees, suppliers, and shareholders of a firm; members of an
industry; or society at large-and specify the relevant community
more precisely by their choice of liability rules and financing
mechanisms. Courts applying and articulating enterprise liability
ideas confront much more well-defined interpretive issues. The issues
that courts must settle arise within statutory schemes or common law
constructs specifying communities of burden and benefit fairly
precisely. Drawing on an enterprise liability conception of fairness to
fix the contours of the scope of employment rule in vicarious liability
law-as Judge Friendly does in the Bushey opinion 1°9 is a classic case
in point.
In the vicarious liability context, enterprise liability ideas point us
towards devising a test for scope of employment which locates the
boundaries of a firm's activity. (Negligence ideas, by contrast, point
us towards devising a test which identifies those firm-related accidents
which the firm should have prevented.) Identifying the boundary of
an activity (e.g., of driving) or of an industry's impact (e.g., of mining's
health effects) is not a possibility before the court. Because this
exercise is an interpretive one through and through, we do not need
an independently specified account of burden and benefit.
IV. LIMITS AND EXCEPTIONS: THE RESILIENCE OF NEGLIGENCE
LIABILITY
The coin that we have been studying has a flip side. Even if the
greater fairness of enterprise liability were widely accepted, and even
if considerations of fairness were widely agreed to be decisive,
enterprise liability would not expand to consume the whole of tort
accident law. Within tort law, negligence liability would prove
remarkably resilient, for at least three reasons. First, it may often be
impossible for the common law to attribute accidents to activities
without the benefit of a fault criterion. Second, risks may sometimes
be uninsurable, in which case enterprise liability will not be able to
realize its distinctive aspirations and the imposition of strict liability
will be no fairer than the imposition of negligence liability. Third,
108. I mean "interpretive" in the sense made famous by Ronald Dworkin. See, e.g.,
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986).
109. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171-72 (2d Cir.
1968).
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competing normative considerations may overcome the presumption
that fairness generates in favor of enterprise liability. Let us consider
these in turn.
A. Attributing Accidents to Activities
The fact that enterprise liability relaxes traditional tort
requirements of causation should not blind us to the fact that it
requires attributing accidents to activities. Enterprise liability is
liability for "characteristic risk." The common law is not always able
to isolate the "characteristic" risks of certain activities.
1. "Characteristic Risk" and the Confluence of Activities
"Characteristic risks" are reasonable risks of a particular kind of
injury which exceed the background level of risk, and flow from the
long-run activity of an enterprise. These risks are reasonable because
we are better off bearing them than preventing them-the "cost" of
prevention exceeds the benefit. They "flow from [an enterprise's]
long-run activity in spite of all reasonable precautions on [its] part." 110
They are characteristic of an enterprise because the enterprise's
presence in the world increases the incidence of the risk above its
normal, background level. The ill-fated drunken sailor whose trespass
precipitated the flooding of the dry dock in Bushey is one justly
famous case in point. Drunkenness, Judge Friendly remarked, is "the
condition for which seamen are famed," ' and increased drunkenness
in the vicinity of berthed Coast Guard vessels is something that
reasonable people might take to be characteristic of the Coast
Guard's enterprise. The long run effect of turning sailors loose on
shore leave may well be to increase the incidence of drunkenness in
the vicinity of the vessels from which they are dispatched.
What might be a parallel example of a background risk? The risk of
increased traffic accidents created by turning sailors loose on shore
leave on the docks of Brooklyn might be an example. Common sense
suggests that sailors on shore leave in Brooklyn are not unusually
prone to precipitate automobile accidents in the vicinity of the vessels
from which they disembark. It seems unlikely that sailors discharged
on the docks of Brooklyn will be driving back and forth between
shore and ship with unusual intensity. Those who do rent cars seem
likely to use them to travel a considerable distance from the
waterfront, dispersing quickly so that the risks they create merge
rapidly into the ordinary risks of the road. This, of course, is very
much a contingent fact. In other settings-say, a military base located
in Southern California, where driving is ubiquitous-military
110. Id. at 171.
111. Id. at 168.
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personnel may well be prone to venture forth from their bases on
leave in their own cars. In that setting, if leave continues to increase
drunkenness, it should also lead to a characteristically greater risk of
automobile accidents." 2
The idea of an occupation's "characteristic risks" or of a firm's
"characteristic risks" is a comprehensible one, relatively welldeveloped in the case law. Even so, hard cases are easy to conjure up.
Suppose that members of particular occupations-salespeople of
various kinds, perhaps-both drive and telephone a great deal in the
course of their work. Suppose further that some such salesperson,
commuting to work in the morning or back home in the evening,
culpably causes an accident because she is talking on her phone.
Should we consider her accident to be a characteristic risk of her
employer's enterprise?
Accidents that occur in the course of
commuting are generally not counted as characteristic risks of
particular employments. 13 People are likely to commute to some job.
If they weren't commuting to this particular job, they would be
commuting to another one, so the connection between a particular job
and a particular commute is generally coincidental not characteristic.
Should this general rule apply to our talkative salesperson? Should it
apply if the phone is fixed in the car and paid for by the business, but
not if it is fully mobile and paid for by the salesperson? Should it
matter if the call was a personal or a business one? Should it matter if
the salesperson was leaving work late or going to work early because
the press of business required her to put in a long day? Should the
background level of risk-the prevalence of talking on the phone
while driving-in this community be critical?
Cases plainly exist where it is hard to say if the negligence involved
is a characteristic risk of the firm's activity, something peculiar to the
life of the driver in question (she was distracted by a furious argument
with her father-in-law who just happened to call while she was
driving), or a feature of the entire community of drivers in the area
where she lives and works (no social sanction is attached to talking on
the phone while driving). Within a well-established enterprise liability
doctrine such as the vicarious liability of employers for the torts of
their employees, hard cases of this sort-close cases-are by and large
manageable. But there are important classes of cases where common
law efforts to construct adequate criteria of "characteristic risk" face

112. See Taber v. Maine, 45 F.3d 598, 600 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying the law of Guam
and holding the United States Government vicariously liable for an automobile
accident involving a navy serviceman who drove off base while on liberty after a
"grueling 24 hour duty shift").
113. See Konradi v. United States, 919 F.2d 1207, 1209 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The
general rule is that an employee is not within the scope of his employment when
commuting to or from his job.").
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great obstacles, because it is difficult to disentangle the long-run

increase in accidents effected by a particular enterprise.
All accidents arise at the intersection of two or more activities. In

some circumstances, it is impossible for the common law of torts to
attribute responsibility for an accident to one of the parties to it
without employing some criterion of fault. 14 Highway accidents are
the canonical case."' In the absence of norms-usually statutesspecifying duties of precaution, rights of way, and so on, it is often
impossible to attribute responsibility for accidental injury. In the
absence of crosswalks, we may not be able to say if a pedestrian or a
driver was responsible for an accident between the two. In the
absence of rules ordering priorities among vehicles at four-way

intersections, we may not be able to say whose activity is responsible
for an accident between two cars at such an intersection.
Highway accidents are (to my mind) somewhat atypical in that
acute problems of attribution arise even in cases where accidents arise
at the intersection of only two activities-when only two vehicles are
involved, or only one vehicle and a pedestrian. Problems of causal

indeterminacy tend to be more acute when accidents arise at the
intersection of multiple activities. When a bus bearing schoolchildren
is struck by a train at a railroad crossing, for example, the accident

arises at the intersection of numerous activities.

The railroad

contributes to the accident by its design and operation of both the
crossing and the train. Surface grade crossings can be replaced by
114. Stephen R. Perry argues in The Impossibility of GeneralStrict Liability, 1 Can.
J.L. & Jurisprudence 147 (1988), that "general strict liability" is impossible because
we cannot attribute accidents to activities without employing fault criteria. Arthur
Ripstein and Jules Coleman essentially accept Perry's arguments in Mischief and
Misfortune, 41 McGill L.J. 91, 107 (1995). See also Arthur Ripstein, Equality,
Responsibility, and the Law 32-53 (1999). If Perry means what Bramwell means, see
supra, note 12-that universal strict liability is impossible-then I agree with him. If
he means, as he sometimes seems to, that there are no effective strict liability
attribution rules-because all effective strict liability rules are fault rules in disguisethen I disagree with him. Some strict liability attribution rules-the "scope of the
employment" test in vicarious liability law, the "scope of the risk" test for abnormally
dangerous activity liability, the manufacturing defect test in product liability law, and
the "arising out of and in the course of employment" test in workers' compensation
law, come to mind-connect accidents and activities as effectively as fault criteria in
many circumstances. Whether or not satisfactory strict attribution rules can be
devised in a particular context depends on the features of the context.
115. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737, 744 (Ex. 1865) (Bramwell, J.,
dissenting), affd 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868) (appeal taken from Ex.). The
thrust of Bramwell's opinion is strongly supportive of a regime of strict liability for
accidents among strangers. The Exchequer Chamber entered judgment in favor of
the defendants on the ground that they were not negligent and Bramwell dissented
"on the plain ground that the defendants have caused water to flow into the plaintiff's
mines, which but for their, the defendants', act would not have gone there." Id. His
position, then, is that it is impossible to attribute a highway collision to one party
rather than another absent fault on one driver's part, and this makes it impossible to
impose strict liability on highway accidents.
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underpasses and overpasses; warning bells and horns can be more and
less piercing; gates can bar access to the tracks more and less
effectively; the schedule and maintenance of the train can affect the
incidence of accidents; as can the selection and training of the
engineers who operate the trains. The traffic department of the city
can affect the incidence of accidents by its designing of roads, routing
of traffic, and timing of lights. The school department can affect the
incidence of accidents by its choice of routes and its selection and
training of drivers. The manufacturer of the bus can, by its choice of
design, affect the ease with which accidents can be avoided and the
severity of the injuries that they cause. Buses can be more or less
maneuverable, more or less soundproof, and more or less
crashworthy.
It can be extremely difficult and even impossible to devise nonfault
attribution rules-such as the "scope of the employment" test for
vicarious liability or the "scope of the risk" test for abnormally
dangerous activities-to apportion responsibility for accidents that
arise at the intersection of multiple activities.116 Negligence norms
must often be deployed by default. Fairness may require that each of
these enterprises-railroading, designing automobiles, transporting
schoolchildren, designing traffic systems-bear its characteristic
accident costs, but complexity tends to defeat the identification of
characteristic risks. Fault liability therefore tends to expand beyond
the boundaries within which fairness wants to confine it.
2. Background Risk
Risks which are very remote-very, very low in probabilitypresent another problem for enterprise liability. Enterprise liability
cannot be instituted by the common law when the nonnegligent risks
of an activity are so low that they simply merge into the general
background risks of living.
Risk of physical harm-diminished
security-is the byproduct of productive activity. Some risk of serious
physical injury and death is the price of activity, of freedom to act.
We cannot farm or build or barbeque or drive or fly without taking
and imposing risks of devastating injury. Reasonable precaution
cannot eliminate all risk. Risks whose existence is the unavoidable
price of activity are the background risks of social life; the background
116. That is not to say that it is always impossible to devise strict liability rules for
accidents that arise at the intersection of multiple activities. Product liability law
proves otherwise. Defect tests which go beyond negligence are familiar in modern
product liability law. The consumer expectation test is a nonfault test, for example,
and the risk-utility test goes beyond fault liability when it judges the adequacy of a
product by the knowledge available at the time of trial instead of the knowledge
available at the time the product was marketed, or when it relaxes the strict kind of
feasible alternative design requirement found in the Restatement Third's formulation
of the defect test.
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against which "characteristic risks" arise. "Background" risks are
typical of social life in general; they are the price of a number of
different activities whose separate contributions cannot be
disentangled. With certain inescapable variations, ordinary activities,
carefully conducted, produce mutually imposed and mutually
beneficial risks." 7 Very, very low probability risks of massive damage
from fire, for example, are created by a wide range of activities:
smoking cigars, pipes, and cigarettes; barbecuing in the backyard;
using electrical appliances or gas stoves; driving gasoline powered
vehicles; and so on.
Equal background risk matures into unequal harm. In the long run,
even very, very low probability harms inevitably issue in serious injury
and death. Fate condemns a small number of us to be victims of the
ordinary nonnegligent risks of social life and fortune spares the rest.
This inequality of harm may well be unfair. Perhaps the inevitable
accidents that issue from the background risks of social life ought to
be shared across society as costs of living.'18 But the unfairness is
beyond the rectification of tort accident law, which can only attribute
accidents to particular activities. It is arbitrary and unfair to attribute
the inevitable accidents that are the fruit of background risk to any
particular activity. The connection between any such accident and
any particular activity is merely fortuitous, a matter of coincidence,
not causation.
It was merely bad luck, for example, that the child plaintiff in Van
Skike v. Zussman"9 was inspired to play with fire and so suffer serious
injury by winning a toy lighter-a miniature plastic plaything
incapable of being lit-as a prize in a gumball machine. He might
have been inspired to play with fire by any of a number of other
things-by a gas grill or a stove burner or a campfire, by seeing a fire
on television, or by some burst of childhood curiosity sparked by
something other than exposure to fire. The connection between this
child's injury and this particular product-this toy lighter-is
coincidental. It is therefore unfair to pin responsibility for this
accident on the parties responsible for selling the toy lighter to the
child.
Because accidents that issue from background risks cannot fairly be
attributed to any particular activity, 2 ° tort accident law must let the
117. See Fried, supra note 4, at 192-93.
118. Note that a nontort version of enterprise liability, like the New Zealand
Accident Compensation plan, could attribute background risks to an activity, namely,
to social life.
119. In Van Skike v. Zussman, 318 N.E.2d 244, 246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974), a small
child "won" a toy cigarette lighter as a prize from a gumball machine, purchased
lighter fluid, and set himself on fire when he attempted to fill the toy lighter with the
lighter fluid.
120. The fire in Van Skike also shows how "industry-wide" liability as well as
"society-wide" liability might be able to institute enterprise liability in circumstances
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losses that flow from background risks lie where they fall. For tort
law, the unfairness of the unequal harm that issues from background
risk is an inevitable one. When the nonnegligent risks of an activity
are so low that they disappear into the standing level of background
risk, negligence liability is at least as fair as strict liability, and more
practicable. Strict enterprise liability is at least as unfair as negligence
2
because it can only connect injuries to activities in an arbitrary way.1 '
And there is no reason that any particular activity should bear any
particular background risk. Strict enterprise liability is less practicable
than negligence because there is no distinctive risk for strict liability to
attach itself to, so the attribution of accidents to activities must,
inevitably, be erratic.
B. UninsurableRisks
Enterprise liability in tort supposes that we live in the "world of
activities," and that the costs of accidents can therefore be distributed
across those who benefit from the imposition of the risks that issue in
those accidents. It supposes that the risks subject to strict liability are
insurable, so that the imposition of strict liability does not merely
"substitute one form of risk for another-the risk of liability for the
risk of personal loss. ' In the "world of acts"-Holmes's world of
"isolated, ungeneralized wrongs"-inability to insure against
accidental injury may have been the norm. The sine qua non of
insurability is a sufficiently large activity. The supposition that we
have moved from the "world of acts" into the "world of activities" is a
stylized but surely substantially accurate one.
Even so, the
supposition that all risks are insurable is too strong. Even within a
"world of activities," some actors and activities may still operate in the
where the common law cannot. The fact that the connection between this child's
injury and the particular product-the toy lighter-whose use occasioned it is
coincidental does not prove that this accident is unconnected to any identifiable
activity. It might make perfect sense to classify this accident as a risk of the broader
activity of "taming fire and putting it to productive use." The risk that children will
take an interest in fire might be classified as a standing risk of having lighters,
matches, ovens, stoves, water heaters, barbecues, candles, chimneys, cigarettes, and
countless other ordinary products and activities that make constructive use of fire. So
conceived, the plaintiff's injury does issue from the "characteristic risk" of an activity,
namely, the activity of "putting fire to use." It might be, that is, a risk: (1) associated
with the presence of a particular activity; and (2) that persists after all reasonable
precautions to reduce it have been taken. If we had at our disposal an "industry-wide
liability" scheme covering the various particular activities that constitute the broader
activity of "putting fire to use," it might make perfect sense not to count this accident
as a background risk of living but as a cost of using fire.
121. Arguably, strict liability is more unfair than negligence in this circumstance. If
there is no justice done by shifting a loss, it may be more unfair to shift it than to let it
lie. The very act of doing so may, in this circumstance, be an injustice. So, too, it may
be unfair to consume resources that would otherwise be available for another use
when there is nothing to be gained from their consumption.
122. Fletcher, supra note 4, at 547; see Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 446 (1873).
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"world of acts." More than that, the liability system experienced what
was widely termed an "insurance crisis" in the mid- to late- 1980s; a
crisis which called into question the possibility and desirability of
enterprise liability in tort.
Prompted by this "insurance crisis," an important strand of legal
scholarship argued forcefully that the long expansion of enterprise
liability over the course of the twentieth century had precipitated an
insurance crisis."' The extension of enterprise liability to a wide
range of activities for which liability insurance was ill-suited had
caused a widespread withdrawal of insurance coverage; that
withdrawal had led, in turn, to the withdrawal of important services.
The nonnegligent risks of small children being abused by caregivers at
day care centers was an ostensible case in point.12 4 Day care centers,
the argument ran, were generally too small to self-insure, and thirdparty insurers were not able to identify the relative riskiness of
prospective insureds cheaply and accurately enough to supply such
insurance. Deprived of insurance, day care centers were forced to
close, leaving working parents in the lurch and the prospective victims
of child abuse-the children themselves-arguably worse off than
they would have been had enterprise liability not been imposed.
The argument that the extension of enterprise liability precipitated
a crisis of insurability (rather than, say, a temporary disruption of such
markets leading to an efficient readjustment) was forcefully
challenged by another, equally important strand of scholarship, in the
early- and mid-1990s 1 25 And the matter remains eminently debatable.
For our purposes, however, it will do to suppose that some risks are
uninsurable, even in the modern "world of activities," and to leave to
another day the task of determining just how broad the range of
uninsurable risks is. Our concern is normative: What is the fair
liability rule for "uninsurable risks"?
When risks are uninsurable, Fletcher's reciprocity of risk criterion
regains its attractiveness. Fairness requires proportionality of benefit
and burden. Within a community of reciprocal risk, everyone benefits
equally from the imposition of nonnegligent risks and should share
equally in the costs of the accidents that issue from those risks. When
accidental losses meet criteria of insurability, this is what enterprise
123. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 76; Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 76, at
1534-39.
124. This is one of a "parade of horribles" recounted by Priest. Priest, Insurance
Crisis,supra note 76, at 1527, 1578-79.
125. See, e.g., Croley & Hanson, supra note 76 (arguing that enterprise liability is
stimulating the rise of mutual insurance companies, which are constructing more
homogeneous and therefore more efficient risk pools); Hanson & Logue, supra note
76 (arguing that first-party insurers fail to adjust premiums according to consumption
choices and that a negligence regime therefore induces manufacturers to make
suboptimal investments in product safety, whereas enterprise liability optimizes
manufacturer care and activity levels).
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liability does. When accidental losses are not insurable, however,
strict liability will simply concentrate the costs of nonnegligent
accidents on those whose misfortune it is to have their activity inflict
injury. Negligence concentrates those costs on a different class of
persons-those whose misfortune it is be injured. Strict liability
'q
simply substitutes the "risk of liability for the risk of personal lOSS. 126
Neither distributes the costs of accidents fairly. Either way, the cost
of the harm is concentrated, not dispersed across the community that
benefits from the freedom to create the kind of risk that has matured
into harm in the case at hand.
In a world where liability cannot be insured against, either liability
or loss may be devastating. If so, negligence liability may be
preferable, because it is equally fair and less expensive to operate.
Strict liability is probably more expensive to administer than
negligence because strict liability requires cranking up the liability
system for nonnegligent accidents as well as for negligent ones, with
all the administrative costs that this entails. 127 The benefit of this extra
expense is not a fairer distribution of the costs of nonnegligent
accidents-just a different distribution.
Holding constant the
incidence of injury, 128 negligence liability may be to the long run
advantage even of those most disadvantaged by a negligence regime,
namely, the victims of nonnegligent accidents. They fare better
bearing such losses and sharing in the extra resources saved by a
system of negligence liability than they do under a system of strict
liability. Under strict liability, they stand an equal chance of bearing
an equivalent loss (in the form of liability) and forego their share of
the extra resources that negligence makes available. In a world of
uninsurable risks, then, negligence liability seems preferable for
reciprocal risks.
The most general argument of this Article has been that fairness
finds its natural expression not in the reciprocity of risk criterion, but
in enterprise liability. The fair distribution of harm is more important
than the fair distribution of risk and-in a world of insurable riskenterprise liability usually distributes harm more fairly than
negligence liability does. The argument assigns pride of place to
126. Fletcher, supra note 4, at 547.
127. On the other hand, strict liability may be cheaper to administer in each case,
because it dispenses with determinations of fault. Just how these offsetting tendencies
play out is unclear. For purposes of the argument, I shall assume that negligence is
cheaper because fewer cases will be brought.
128. If strict liability reduces the incidence of injury, things may be different.
Because nonnegligent accidents strike like lightning in a world of uninsurable risks,
and because victims and injurers are the same people when risks are reciprocal, there
is some reason to doubt that strict liability will induce greater safety. Strict liability
and negligence will leave the costs of nonnegligent accidents on the same people:
strict liability in those persons' capacities as injurers, negligence in their capacities as
victims.
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considerations of fairness in our thinking about the design of tort
liability; they are placed in the center of our "deliberative field.' 29
The argument of the next and final part of the Article is that
considerations of fairness are not the only considerations operating
within that field. Other considerations, normative or practical, may
lead to the displacement of the enterprise liability generally favored
by considerations of fairness. The "all things considered" best liability
regime for any particular context will depend on the interaction of
general considerations of fairness with any special normative and
practical considerations applicable to that context. One consequence
of this is that substantial domains of fault liability will persist even if
we make the ideal of fairness the principal ideal of our tort accident
law, and even if that ideal generally favors enterprise liability.
C. Competing Normative Considerations
In some cases, competing normative considerations (perhaps in
conjunction with practical problems in the construction of attribution
rules) defeat the common law institutionalization of enterprise
liability. Property rights are an interesting case in point, in part
because they can cut both for and against enterprise liability. In
certain circumstances, the presence of property rights increases the
attractiveness of enterprise liability and facilitates its administration.1 30
Real property rights increase the attractiveness of enterprise liability
when accidents arise from the overflow of one landowner's activities
onto another's. Ownership of real property confers special freedom
of action within the property's boundaries, and sharpens the
boundaries between zones of activity. Within the boundaries of their
properties, owners and occupiers are free to build reservoirs and keep
wild boars, even if these activities impose abnormally great risks of
injury."' When boars run wild and reservoirs burst, however, owners
and occupiers are justly subject to enterprise liability.
The special freedom conferred by property rights includes the
freedom to subject one's own property to unusually great risks.
Overflowing the boundaries of one's property and imposing the cost
of one's activities on strangers, by contrast, is the very essence of
unfairness.
By helping to locate the boundary between the
129. For the idea of a "deliberative field" within which all considerations of
practical reason must be unified, see Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral
Judgment 152, 182-83, 196-202 (1993).
130. See William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 Colum. L.
Rev. 1705, 1729, 1757, 1779 (1992) (emphasizing how strict liability can protect
various zones of activity, including ones defined by property rights, from intrusion).
131. See Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1974) (holding defendant strictly
liable for injuries inflicted by his vicious hog when it escaped from his property and
injured his neighbor); Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868)
(appeal taken from Ex.) (holding Rylands strictly liable for harm to Fletcher's mines
inflicted by the escape of water from his reservoir).
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permissible use of one's own resources and the impermissible
appropriation of another's resources, the presence of property rights
increases the attractiveness of enterprise liability. By sharpening the
often elusive boundary between enterprises, property rights also
facilitate the practical administration of enterprise liability.
In
Bushey, for example, the plaintiff's ownership of the dry dock plays a
critical role in identifying the boundaries between its enterprise and
the Coast Guard's. 132 The plaintiff's and the defendant's enterprises
are intimately and beneficially intertwined in Bushey. Remove the
plaintiff's property rights from the scene and the boundary between
injurer and victim enterprises becomes much more difficult to
establish. Seaman Lane's trespass disappears.
Property rights tend to diminish the attractiveness of enterprise
liability, however, when victims suffer injury in the course of entering
onto injurers' land. The risks to which entrants on others' land are
exposed do not arise out of the voluntary agency of injurers in the
straightforward way that normal accidents among strangers do.
Highway accidents involving the abnormal risks of gasoline tankers,
for instance, arise out of a voluntary decision made by those who own
such vehicles to expose other drivers to this abnormal risk; a decision
made in pursuit of profit. Voluntary exposure of others to risk in
pursuit of one's own ends is a normal and morally significant feature
of those accidents to which enterprise liability most readily attaches.13 3
Landowner liability, by contrast, emerges out of the victim's entry
onto the owner's or occupier's property. This affects the initial
distribution of burden and benefit and the foreseeability of the
victim's presence at the scene of the injurer's activity. The entry of
the victim onto the scene of the injurer's activity also makes it more
difficult, both conceptually and practically, to locate the boundary
between the injurer's and the victim's enterprises.
Entrants onto land-unlike victims on sidewalks or persons
standing in the doorways of their own homes'--are not legally
132. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 1968).
133. See, e.g., Rylands, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. at 342.
The Defendants, in order to effect an object of their own, brought on to their
land ... a large accumulated mass of water, and stored it up in a reservoir.
The consequence of this was damage to the Plaintiff, and for that damage,
however skillfully [sic] and carefully the accumulation was made, the
Defendants ... were certainly responsible.
Id. (Lord Cranworth, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see Clare Dalton, Losing
History: Tort Liability in the Nineteenth Century and the Case of Rylands v. Fletcher
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (setting out the moral foundations
of "activity based liability").
134. See Shipley v. Fifty Assocs., 106 Mass. 194, 199 (1870) (addressing a claim
brought by a plaintiff who walked on a public sidewalk and was struck by falling ice
and snow that had accumulated on defendant's peaked roof); Tuchkashinsky v.
Lehigh & W. Coal Co., 49 A. 308 (Pa. 1901) (addressing claim brought by a plaintiff
who was standing in the doorway of her father's house, 700 feet from defendant's
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entitled to be where they are absent special authorization from the
owner or occupier of the land. The circumstances of their entry affect
both the distribution of burden and benefit between injurer and
victim, and the extent to which the potential victim's presence should
be anticipated and her safety ensured. Felony trespassers, for
instance, enter the injurer's land without permission, seeking to
appropriate a benefit to themselves and to reap that benefit by
inflicting injury upon the owner or occupier of the land. This
relationship of burden and benefit is enough to suspend the
imposition not just of enterprise liability, but of ordinary negligence
liability as well. Burden and benefit are arranged differently-they
are presumptively mutual-when the potential victim's presence on
the property is authorized. The authorization of the potential victim's
presence also makes that presence expected, not just foreseeable. By
authorizing a potential victim to enter the property, the owner or
occupier of land assumes an affirmative obligation towards him.'35
These are all morally significant features of the relationship between
potential injurer and potential victim, and they bear upon-though
they do not determine-the design of tort duties.
The present state of landowner liability to entrants onto land,
indeed, shows how the presence of property rights and relationships
can affect the articulation of tort duties in a way that presses against
enterprise liability, for both practical and normative reasons.
Enterprise liability has never gained a foothold here. Negligence
liability vies with an older regime of variable duty drawn from
property law, a regime that distinguishes among entrants and the
duties owed to them on the basis of their status, where gradations of
status roughly reflect the extent of the entrant's permission to enter
and the degree of benefit the entrant confers on the occupier.
Enterprise liability faces two daunting challenges. On the one hand,
there is a practical problem of attribution. The victim's entrance onto
the injurer's land makes the agencies of injurer and victim difficult to
disentangle. On the other hand, the victim's entry onto the injurer's
land raises normative questions about the distribution of burden and
benefit.
The normative implications of the victim's entry are implicated in a
range of cases. They come into play when potential victims enter onto
land with criminal intentions; when they enter seeking commercial
benefit; and when they enter in pursuit of particular risky recreational
experiences. (In this circumstance, landowner liability takes on the
mine, and was harmed by the concussion from a blast caused when lightning ignited
explosives stored at the mine); Bolton v. Stone, 1951 A.C. 850 (appeal taken from
C.A.) (addressing a claim brought by a plaintiff who was struck by a cricket ball that
escaped from a nearby cricket field while he was walking on the street).
135. See Francis H. Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligation in the Law of Tort,
53 Am. L. Reg. 209, 273, 337 (1905).
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essential feature of "primary assumption of risk" cases. 13 6) The
difficulty of disentangling injurer and victim activity is practically
significant when that interpenetration of activities makes it difficult to
attribute harm to one or the other enterprise. Other things equal, the
attractiveness of negligence liability increases in step with the
difficulty of disentangling victim and injurer activity. Fault criteria
can attribute harms to one party or another in circumstances where
enterprise liability rules are unable to do so.
There is, moreover, a wide range of circumstances in which
practical problems of attribution and competing normative
considerations may, separately or jointly, rebut the thrust of even a
common law predisposed to enterprise liability. (It is worth recalling
that even the vicarious liability of employers for the torts of their
employees-the oldest common law source of enterprise liabilityitself tends to incorporate a substantial element of negligence. It
attributes the torts of employees to a firm, and those torts are most
often negligence.) The set of possible circumstances and legal norms
that might affect the articulation of tort norms is open-ended. We
cannot say in advance what fairness calls for when tort norms interact
with a circumstance we have never considered. Consider, very briefly,
two further circumstances.
Within a community of risk, the special character of an activity can
justify retreating from strict liability and, indeed, even relaxing
negligence duties. The character of an activity can require a higher
than normal level of risk. In such cases, risk is essential to the
enjoyment of the activity; reduce the risk and you destroy the activity.
Sports are the preeminent exafnple here. Making every injury
characteristic of the sport an occasion for liability would undermine
professional football.
Indeed, taking a traditional negligence
approach and making every injury inflicted in violation of the rules an
occasion for the imposition of liability would cast a pall over the play
of the game. For these activities to flourish, it is necessary to retreat
from our normal conceptions of responsibility to prevent and rectify
harm done.
In tort doctrine, this is the domain of "primary
assumption of the risk" and "relaxed duty."' 37
136. See infra text accompanying note 137.
137. See, e.g., Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600 (N.J. 1994) (suspending duty of
ordinary care in the recreational sports context, and adopting a recklessness
standard); Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 13 (Wash. 1992) (applying
the doctrine of "primary assumption of risk," which relieves prospective injurers of
their duty of ordinary care, to skiing). Note, though, that negligence liability wreaks
more havoc with such activities than strict liability does. Negligence liability criticizes
conduct. Unless its ordinary strictures are relaxed, it tends to criticize the normal
conduct of contact sports. Enterprise liability in the form of mandatory loss insurance
among those engaged in the sport might well be desirable. Participants in these
activities might well prefer receiving compensation for out-of-pocket expenses
incurred as a result of injuries received in the ordinary course of such activities to
suffering severe injury without any compensation. But the law of torts is not in a
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To take just one more example, consider product accidents. The
paradigm product accident, for example, arises out of a contractual
relationship between injurer and victim-the relationship of buyer
and seller. Contract norms therefore interact with tort ones, and the
significance of the victim's participation in the enterprise that injured
her must be appraised. This need not lead to the displacement of
enterprise liability by fault liability; liability for breach of contract has
a strict element, and the body of doctrine leading into and developing
out of Section 402A of the Second Restatement had a strong
enterprise liability cast.138 But it does present enterprise liability with
a significant practical challenge: How to go about distinguishing
between injurer and victim activities in this setting? Injurers typically
participate in the genesis of product accidents by manufacturing,
designing, and marketing the instrumentality of injury. Victims
participate by purchasing and using that instrumentality. The design
of enterprise liability rules must take these facts into account. The
"characteristic risks" of choosing and using a particular product must
be distinguished from the "characteristic risks" of manufacturing and
marketing that product. Under enterprise liability, the former risks
belong on the victim who purchases and uses the product, whereas the
latter risks belong on the injurer who produces and markets the
instrument of injury. Devising adequate rules is a formidable practical
The partial resurgence of negligence conceptions in
challenge.
product warning and design defect law, so that negligence and
enterprise liability conceptions now compete in the law,13 9 may reflect,
in part, the difficulties involved in instituting enterprise liability.
Even with these limits and exceptions, the phenomenon of
enterprise liability is a remarkably important one. We live, as Holmes
long ago saw, in a world of vast, organized enterprises and systemic
risk-in a "world of activities"-not in the world of "isolated,
ungeneralized wrongs" out of which "[o]ur law of torts comes."'140 In
our world, enterprise liability generally distributes the costs of
accidents more fairly than negligence liability does. When enterprise
liability is feasible, we have strong reasons of fairness to favor it over
negligence liability. It is a tribute to the power and fertility of John
Rawls's work that it enables us to see more clearly, and comprehend
more deeply, these reasons.
position to implement this sort of enterprise liability, because it is not in a position to
adjust the normal tort measure of damages.
138. George L. Priest, in The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A CriticalHistory
of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461 (1985),
overstates this truth and mistakenly identifies strict liability with absolute liability, but
captures vividly the enterprise liability aspirations of Prosser and other "founders" of
modern product liability law. The doctrines noted in the previous footnote reflect
these aspirations.
139. See Tort and Accident Law, supra note 1, at 951-68, 974-1026.
140. Holmes, supra note 64, at 183.
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